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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper studies the links between corporate governance and one of the major technological 
innovations of the modern era, mobile telephony.  We focus on three countries of the Nordic area 
– Sweden, Norway and Finland – asking why this relatively small and indeed peripheral region 
has become a world leader in this complex and dynamic technology. Our argument is that the 
governance systems of the major telecommunciations service companies of the region underlies 
the evolution of the technology. 
The approach taken to corporate governance in this paper differs from that which is common in 
the literature. Rather than looking at governance as a problem of how corporate managements 
comply with the value maximisation objectives of shareholders we follow Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan (2000) in seeing it in terms of resource allocation. Specifically, we are concerned with 
the processes through which firms allocate resources to tangible and intangible investments in 
innovation. A key question is how different modes of corporate governance contribute to 
innovation performance and economic growth over the long run. 
The Nordic region is a world leader in the diffusion of ICT products and services, and has a 
sustained record of innovation and enterprise development in telecommunications. In recent 
years, most of the attention in this field has gone to such firms as Ericsson and Nokia. In 2000 
Ericsson supplanted Lucent as the leading producer of telecom equipment, mainly because of its 
position in mobile networks. Ericsson now has a 40% global market share in GSM infrastructure 
systems, a strong position in other major mobile standards (such as TDMA), and was by the end 
of May 2001 involved in 31 of 50 3G infrastructure agreements announced, in many cases as sole 
supplier. Nokia has continued to increase its lead on global terminal (that is, handset) markets. In 
2000 Nokia’s market share was more than 30%, over double the share of second placed Motorola. 
Its market share had increased to more than 35% by the end of the first quarter of 2001, 
approaching the goal set by Nokia of a 40% global market share.  
In seeking to understand the evolution of the technology, and the growth of the firms themselves, 
we emphasize the need to look behind the firms, at the long run commitment of resources into 
telecommunications in the Nordic area. The development trajectory in this field has now lasted 
more than a century, and has shaped the overall capabilities of the region, as well as the dynamics 
of such firms as Ericsson and Nokia. The long-term role of telecommunications service providers 
– firms such as Telia, Telenor and Sonera – is central to the development of capabilities, and the 
development of the technlogies and standards that culminated in satellite communications, in the 
NMT technology, and then in GSM. These telecoms enterprises played central formative roles in 
all of the major innovation decisions, and in the evolution of the technology as a whole. Telia, 
Telenor and Sonera are former publicly-owned monopolists, whose governance was shaped by 
complex social, regional and industrial objectives; the governance systems permitted the 
emergence of far-sighted technological cultures. So we argue that it was precisely the governance 
structure of these enterprises that permitted and shaped the long-term technological, engineering 
and skill commitments, in the face of sustained uncertainty, that made the radical innovation of 
mobile telephony possible. These enterprises made bold, long-term bets on a range of radical 
technologies in communications. It was their decisions that shaped the technologies brought to 
fruition by Ericsson and Nokia, and indeed they who decided which firms would win and lose, for 
some key equipment suppliers disappeared along the way. Now, of course, telia, Telenor and 
Sonera are deregulated and largely privatised, and so major governance shifts have occurred 
simultaeously with the evolution of the core technologies.  We conclude by discussing whether 
and how these governance shifts affect the ability of these enterprises to sustain technological 
advance in the years ahead. 
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Wherever two or three Swedes, or Norwegians, or Danes, or Finns of Scandinavian descent, 
are gathered together, they almost infallibly proceed to immediately establish a church, a 
school, and a telephone exchange, 
A. R. Bennet: The Telephone Systems of the Continent of Europe,  
Longmans, Green and Co., London 1895 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
It is often suggested that innovation is shaped by institutional factors, but innovation theory is 
not particularly strong in identifying the relevant institutions, let alone how they operate, or 
how they influence specific technological trajectories. This paper studies the impact of a 
central institution of capitalism, the system of corporate governance, on one of the major 
technological innovations of the modern era, mobile telecommunications.  We focus on three 
countries of the Nordic area – Sweden, Norway and Finland – asking why is it that this 
relatively small and indeed peripheral region has become a world leader in this complex and 
dynamic technology.  
Modern mobile telecommunications is by any standards a radical technological shift, 
incorporating a range of technological developments in a complex and large-scale 
technological system. However it is by no means a recent innovation, and has involved 
prolonged and comprehensive programmes of search, based on the commitment of substantial 
financial and technological resources over long periods, in the face of considerable 
uncertainty.  In analysing how this was possible, we emphasize the importance of a long-run 
perspective focusing on the structure and operations of corporate governance in this sector in 
the Nordic countries.  
How should corporate governance be understood in this context? Most users of the term 
‘corporate governance’ are concerned with arrangements that are intended to align the 
behaviour of professional managers with the financial interests of shareholders – that is, 
arrangements that cause managers to maximise ‘shareholder value’ (an ambiguous term that 
usually means achieving a high stock market valuation of the enterprise). But corporate 
governance can be thought of differently, in the manner pioneered by Lazonick and 
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O’Sullivan, as the process through which resources are allocated within the enterprise 
(Lazonick and O’Sullivan, 2000). Their approach, followed here, focuses on the enterprise 
strategies and processes of control that encourage or inhibit the commitment of resources to 
the development of the enterprise: such resources include training and capability-building, 
R&D, engineering development, and capital investment. Here, the institutional mechanisms 
are likely to be far more complex than those relating simply to the financial performance of 
enterprises. 
In Nordic mobile telecommunications most of the attention of financial analyists and 
innovation theorists has been on the spectacular performance of such companies as Nokia and 
Ericsson – hardware producers which have generated a constant stream of product 
innovations. However we emphasize the long-term role of telecommunications service 
providers – firms such as Telia, Telenor and Sonera. These enterprises played central 
formative roles in the innovation decisions, and in the evolution of the technology. We argue 
that it was precisely the governance structure of these enterprises that permitted and shaped 
the long-term commitments that made this radical innovation possible. These enterprises are 
former publicly-owned monopolists, now deregulated and largely privatised, and so major 
governance shifts have occurred simultaeously with the evolution of the core technologies.  
We shall argue that these governance shifts raise interesting questions about the continued 
ability of these enterprises to sutain technological advance. 
This paper has three sections. The following section briefly outliens the dimensions of ICT 
diffusion in the Nordic area, and some of the issues raised by it. This is followed by an 
extended overview of the development of the major telecoms suppliers in the Nordic area, 
focusing on three companies - Telia, Telenor and Sonera. We then turn to an analysis of the 
development of wireless communications in the Nordic area, exploring the links between the 
governance of these enterprises, the evolution of the technology, and innovation in the 
supplier enterprises. 
2. Telecommunications services and diffusion in the Nordic area 
In terms of most indicators of ICT use, the Nordic countries are among the global leaders. On 
the ITU composite telecom indicator (based on penetration rates of mobile phones, internet 
hosts, internet users, PC ownership and ISDN subscribers) Norway, Finland, Denmark and 
Sweden rank respectively numbers 1, 2, 3 and 6 in the world. Along a series of indicators of 
telecom use, there is at least one Nordic country among the three global leaders in each area. 
In four of six indicators from the ITU World Telecommunications Database shown below, a 
Nordic country tops the list. Just as they were global leaders in the implementation of fixed 
telephony during the first decades of the telephone’s history, they are global leaders in the 
implementation and utilisation of advanced telecom systems, mobile telephony and wireless 
applications today.1 
 
1  A similar picture is painted at the EU level in the recent ESIS report, DG Information Society, 
Information Society Indicators in the Member States of the European Union, European Commission 
October 2000. 
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Figure 1 
Selected telecom penetration rates 2000. Global leaders and Nordic countries.  
  Global leadership Nordic countries 
  1 2 3 FIN NOR SWE DNK 
Country rank DNK NOR CHE 13 2 5 1 Main lines per 
100 inhabitants Value 2000 or latest 
avail. year 75.3 72.9 72.0 55.2 72.9 68.2 75.3 
Country rank ISL FIN JPN 2 5 7 10 Digital main 
lines of total Year achieved 100% 1995 1996 1997 1996 1997 1998 1998 
Country rank AUT ITA FIN 3 5 4 12 Cellular 
subscribers per 
100 inhabitants 
Value 2000 or latest 
avail. year 78.6 73.7 72.6 72.6 70.3 71.4 61.0 
Country rank NOR CHE DNK 11 1 14 3 ISDN 
subscribers pr 
100 inhabitants 
Value 2000 or latest 
avail. year 11.9 10.3 7.0 3.0 11.9 1.3 7.0 
Country rank USA SWE CHE 8 4 2 7 Personal 
computers pr 
100 inhabitants  
Value 2000 or latest 
avail. year 58.5 50.7 50.2 39.6 49.1 50.7 43.2 
Country rank USA ISL FIN 3 5 9 11 Internet hosts pr 
100 inhabitants Value 2000 or latest 
avail. year 29.3 14.2 10.2 10.2 10.1 6.7 6.3 
Country rank ISL POR NOR 7 3 4 9 Internet users pr 
100 inhabitants Value 2000 or latest 
avail. year 59.8 59.5 49.1 37.2 49.1 45.6 36.6 
Source: ITU World Telecommunications Database, 2001 
These countries are among the global leaders in the development and use of new telecom 
services (such as text messaging), as well as being host countries of major global producers of 
telecom equipment and systems. With wireless systems and applications being regarded as 
one of the major dynamic areas of ICT growth at the present time, we have a unique situation 
in which very small countries are playing a leading role in an important technological 
revolution. Because of this rapid diffusion, the Nordic area functions as a global test 
laboratory of new and prospective wireless technology and related consumer dynamics. 
In analysing this achievement, most analysts have focussed attention on the two major 
producers of telecom equipment, Ericsson and Nokia, and their transformation over the last 20 
years into global leaders in the area of mobile technology. During the late 1990s these firms 
were discovered by international capital markets, despite the fact that each company has a 
business history of more than a century, and they became stars of the international stock 
markets. This was primarily a result of their entry into and success in wireless 
telecommunications. The interesting question of how these two companies succeeded in this 
technological and business transformation is often addressed purely at the company level, 
focussing on innovative strategic initiatives by company management. Nokia CEO Jorma 
Ollila, for  example,  is frequently portrayed as a maverick manager who saw something in 
1992 that nobody else saw, and acted on it to make Nokia a global leader. 
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This perspective is misleading. Certainly, these companies have had a remarkable 
development, and their managements have made a range of wise choices and bets. However, 
focussing just on these companies and their global activities cannot provide a full 
understanding of how they attained their present positions. They are part of wider techno-
industrial complexes, or development blocks to use Erik Dahmén’s famous concept, that have 
been a significant focus of national industrial policies in their respective countries for many 
decades. The long-standing relation between Televerket (the Swedish PTO) and Ericsson is a 
classic case of an integrated ‘development pair’ (Fridlund 1997). We argue that these 
contextual aspects ultimately provide the link between the two empirical facts of rapid 
deployment and social acceptance of telecom services in these countries, and the global 
position attained by these companies, as well as being important factors in the shaping of the 
strategic choices and priorities made by companies such as Ericsson and Nokia.  
The Nordic PTOs, the national telecom service providers, have played a major, indeed often a 
decisive, role in the development and diffusion of ICT in the Nordic area. Much of the 
hardware development has occurred in tandem with long-term innovations in types and levels 
of telecommunications services, and the service providers have played a major role in shaping 
the evolution of the technology, the standards it embodies,  and therefore the whole process of 
equipment supply. We claim here that the former public PTOs2 were decisive for the later 
global success of the Nordic telecoms industry, and especially for Nokia and Ericsson. As we 
shall show, this was part of an evolutionary process: other lines of technological advance 
emerged, and other companies developed and died along the way. But we look beyond the 
growth of these companies to the development of mobile cellular telephony as a whole. Our 
argument places great emphasis on the design and procurement role of the PTOs, as 
organizations with a strongly forward-looking and technology-oriented role. It was the 
governance structures of the PTOs, not just the entrepreneurial capabiliteis of specific 
hardware suppliers, that laid the foundations of wireless telephony success in the Nordic area. 
The governance structures associated with the PTOs were crucial in establishing a framework 
for technological system development and commercial exploitation of telecom developments. 
Over the past decade these governance regimes have changed considerably. In the finals 
ection of this paper we raise questions about the capability of the present governance regime 
in these enterprises to launch development projects of similar technological and economic 
scope in the future. 
3. Changing roles of the Nordic PTOs – an overview 
In this paper we keep our focus mainly on the former PTOs in Finland, Norway and Sweden, 
since they were key organisations within the telecommunications systems of individual 
countries, and in the Nordic area as a whole. In fact their influence, via the establishment of 
standards (notably GSM) has been global.   
 
2  We use the generic PTO acronym for the public telephone and telegraph organisations and authorities, 
instead of the more common concept of PTTs, Post, Telegraph and Telephone organisations. In the 
three countries considered here, the PTOs of Sweden and Norway were organised outside the public 
organisation of postal services from the beginnings in the 1850s. The Finnish history differs from the 
Norwegian and Swedish ones; there, the early public organisation of telecom activities is intimately 
linked to the political history of Finland up to the mid-20th century. A separate PTO was organised from 
the integrated PTT, established in 1927, in Finland as part of a reorganisation following the new 
Telecommunication Act introduced in 1987. A large number of private telecom suppliers, today 
organised in the Finnet Group, have played a significant part in the Finnish telecom system since its 
origins more than a century ago. 
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There was nothing accidental about this. The national PTOs built substantial technological 
and telecom-related competences especially during the post war period, using their position to 
shape national telecom systems and industrial development. However, during the last 25 years 
these organisations have been through a major transformation process involving de-regulation 
and privatisation. The de-regulation process implied a radical change in the governance 
structure of these organisations, as well as in their development strategies of technological 
systems and telecom services. The immediate task of this section is to sketch the differences 
in the governance systems and innovation strategies of these companies before, during and 
following the de-regulation period. We will do this by outlining the structure and governance 
system of PTOs at three points in time, together with describing their contemporary 
innovation strategies and how these were set; 
• during the late 1970s. This was the high point of the original integrated PTO structures, at 
a time when automation of the telecom systems and program controlled switching systems 
was promising the completion of the tasks of providing voice-based analog telephony to 
all citizens. The emerging agenda of digitalisation and promises of wider 
telecommunications provided promising scenarios for future telecom systems and the role 
of the PTOs. The PTOs had a strictly national focus and were increasingly seen as a vital 
element of national technological infrastructures, supporting national development of new 
industrial activities. In governance terms, PTOs were closely connected to relevant 
ministries, and strongly oriented towards technology objectives. 
• in the mid-1980s. At this time the process of de-regulation was in full sway. As 
monopolies were de-regulated the PTOs, their supervising agencies and policy were hard 
at work trying to find ways to reorganise the PTOs to meet competition in several 
segments of their activities. While the functional aspect of contemporary PTOs still were 
mostly national, the regard for internationalisation of technology and system development 
had increased.  
• at the end of the 1990s. In 1998 all countries were required to comply with the EU 
directive on telecom regulation and to have a deregulated telecom system in place. The 
chain of market regulation, certification and supply of telecom services had by this time 
been fully reorganised, while the national telecom operating companies had been 
reorganised on the basis of stock-based ownership and limited liability. By 2000 the 
telecom industry was generally regarded as a globalised industry, with expectations of the 
future industry to be dominated by trans-national, even global, oligopolies in service 
provision, in system deliveries and technology development. Government holdings in 
these companies remained, but governance had largely been transformed. 3 
Today the most visible heritage of these PTOs, the Swedish company Telia and Sonera in 
Finland, from 1 January 2003 forming the TeliaSonera Group, and the Norwegian Telenor, 
are organised as joint stock companies, with a rapidly diminishing public ownership. As these 
companies emerged during the 1980’s and 1990’s the organisation of PTO activities was 
fundamentally altered. Firstly, the reorganisation of the former PTO agencies as publicly 
owned companies was accompanied with a devolution of a wide range of the de facto 
monopoly rights of these agencies, on terminal equipment, on service provision etc. Secondly, 
their responsibilities for national standardisation were transferred to new and separate telecom 
authorities. Lastly, responsibility for regulation and competition surveillance was placed with 
new authorities outside the reorganised PTOs. 
 
3  In May 2001 the Swedish and Norwegian Parliaments acknowledged a goal of reducing puiblic 
ownership to 30-35% from today’s 70-75%. 
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We will argue that the performance of these companies raises important issues related to 
innovation and corporate governance, since each has emerged from public ownership (and in 
fact are only partly privatised today), yet all have been responsible for ambitious investment 
and innovation strategies. It is often suggested that much of the dynamism of modern 
telecoms results from deregulation and more market-oriented strategies and modes of 
governance. But the governance issues are far more complex than just a public-private 
transition accompanied by rapid growth. There has in fact been a complex four-way 
interaction between publicly owned telecommunications companies (and their research arms); 
government ministries responsible for transport, posts and telecommunications; government 
agencies responsible for industrial strategy; and major supplier companies. The present 
dynamism of telecom development is closely linked to features of the former PTO-based 
telecom system. To some extent it may be argued that the present dynamism is a direct effect 
of choices and priorities made by the ‘old’ system. For example, Ericsson’s later success may 
be traced to one single project, the PTO-Ericsson joint venture that developed the digital AXE 
switching system, a venture initiated in 1970 at the prime minister level (a case that will be 
discussed in more detail below).  
So the current highly competitive telecommunications markets in the Nordic area should not 
obscure the far more regulated background within which key telecom technologies were 
developed. In analysing these developments, we argue that Nordic telecommunications 
development should be seen not only in terms of  institutional interactions and collective 
development, but also as a cumulative process occurring over a very long time period. This is 
not just a matter of looking back over a decade or two. In fact the relevant time periods are 
long – it could be argued that  a good understanding of Nordic developments in this field 
requires a horizon of a century or more. Even with respect to the current technology, key 
decisions go back thirty years or more. In any event, in what follows, we adopt a historical 
approach, stressing the importance of cumulative innovation and investment decisions over 
long time periods.  This is important not only in understanding the course of developments, 
but also in understanding what did not happen – why, for example, did producers in Norway 
and Denmark, with leading technological capabilities in radio transmission systems, fail to 
develop? 
4. Corporate Governance in Swedish Telecom – Structures and 
Strategies  
Organizationally, Televerket had for a long time been dominated by civil servants and 
engineers, generating a genuine engineering culture with a strong technological focus. A 
factor, contributing to this technologically oriented organisation culture, was the tradition of 
educating own staff through the “school of telecom” (Teleskolan). Educational facilities 
included both general introductory courses for non-skilled workers as well as higher degree 
engineering studies. Consequently, not too many university graduates were employed in 
Televerket in the period in question, a situation that did not change until the 1980s and 90s. In 
ths respect it is worth noting that Televerket’s practice was similar to that of large Japanese 
corporations. In Televerket, this practice was maintained for many years and had a great 
impact on the character of the organisation.  
During the 1960s and 1970s, Televerket went through a series of comprehensive restructuring 
campaigns, aiming at rationalising the organisation. Following a parliament decision in 1965, 
Televerket established its first subsidiary company, Telefabrikation AB (TEFAB), in January 
1966, with a share capital of 10 MSEK. In the following years, the Parliament decided that 
three additional companies should be created within Televerket. The first was the wholly 
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owned subsidiary Swedish Telecommunication Consulting AB (Swedtel) in 19684, then 
ELLEMTEL5 was established together with LM Ericsson in 1970. Finally, in 1972 the 50% 
owned SOS Alarmerings AB (SOSAB)6 was created to promote the establishment of local 
emergency centres. Wthin the organisation of Televerket, the levels of authority were reduced 
from seven to four and the telephone operations were divided into 20 “teleregions”. Thus, a 
matrix organisation was created, where vital functions were coordinated in centralised 
agencies common to all the teleregions. One of these functions was marketing, which never 
had been an issue in Televerket until the marketing division was opened in 1971. In addition 
some nationwide divisions were kept, like the industrial division (Teli), the radio division, the 
material division and the buildings division. The overall objective of these measures was to 
gather similar activities in individual agencies, clarify functions, support delegation and 
generally increase the economic efficiency of the organisation (Lernevall and Åkesson 1997). 
Another important incidence coincided with this organisational transformation of Televerket 
in the 1970s, namely the appointment of Tony Hagström as Director General in 1977. 
Hagström was a high-profile economist, who had enjoyed a rapid political career as 
parliamentary secretary in the socialist government’s Ministry of Industry, before the 
conservatives took over in 1976 (Andersson 1999). The choice of Hagström as DG reinforced 
the shift in Televerket’s strategic focus towards a market orientation, that was indicated the 
early organisational changes around 1970. 
The move to liberalization 
In the 1980s, Televerket was subject to very much the same legislative governance structures 
as in the 1970s, implying that there were no real changes in the appointment and composition 
of Telestyrelsen. In 1986, all previous instructions and statutory instruments were replaced by 
a new legislative decree, Teleförordningen, which was in force to 1993 when it was 
substituted by the first Swedish law of telecommunication. Predominantly, the content of 
Teleförordningen resembled the decrees it replaced, except for some new elements following 
the 1980s liberalisation process of the telecommunications sector, which will be the main 
theme here.  
Altogether, the 1980s represented a decade of major change for Televerket, in terms of both 
technology and altered market conditions. In this period, the telecommunications sector in 
Sweden, as well as in most other countries, was subject to a liberalisation process, which 
implied that the previous monopoly gradually ceased to prevail. In addition, Televerket was 
facing the challenge of technological convergence, and the technological diversification 
resulting from it. In many ways, the process of convergence represented a technological 
discontinuity, to which Televerket had to adapt, although it allegedly imposed far-reaching 
consequences on its operating environment. In this respect, major political and organisational 
changes seemed appropriate as means to adapt to the challenges posed by this development. 
This seemed to be the general opinion of both Televerket and the political authorities at the 
time, and major efforts were made towards market orientation of Televerket. 
The initial steps towards market orientation  
According to Karlsson (1998), the first signal of the forthcoming liberalisation of the 
telecommunication sector occurred as early as 1965, when the Parliament decided that 
Televerket should establish TEFAB. Allegedly, TEFAB represented a means to strengthen the 
 
4 Swedtel later became the largest telecommunication consulting company in Europe. 
5 See below 
6 The other 50% of the shares was owned by Kommunförbundet (Swedish Association of Local Authorities) and 
Landstingsförbundet (Federation of Swedish County Councils) (Karlsson 1998).  
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manufacture capacity of Televerket, in the face predicted growth flowing from new 
developments in telecommunication technology. Thus, the establishment of TEFAB seemed 
both to imply a clearer technlogical orientation, as well as to clearing the way for the process 
of market orientation, which characterised Televerket’s strategic behaviour in the 1980s. 
In October 1980, the non-socialist coalition government then in power presented an additional 
bill, P 80/81:66, where the issue of telecommunications was addressed. Here, the overall 
political objectives of Televerket were formulated for the first time, stating that Televerket 
was to be responsible for satisfying the requirements of Telecommunications for both 
individuals as well as society in general. Additionally, the government made it clear that they 
regarded information technology an area of priority, as a means to improve Swedish industry 
and to increase Sweden’s competitiveness internationally. By presenting this 
telecommunications bill, the government had placed telecommunication issues on the political 
agenda and thus facilitated the forthcoming self-government of Televerket. The proposals of 
the bill, which was based on a previous initiative from Tony Hagström and Televerket, fell 
into two main categories - the first concerned the demarcation of the monopoly sector, and the 
second affected the organisation of Televerket (P 80/81:66, Karlsson 1998, Lernevall and 
Åkesson 1997).  
The telecommunications bill proposed that only equipment for voice communication over the 
public telephone network and modems for data transmission should be included in the 
monopoly sector (P 80/81:66). However, the proposal to cease the annual assessments of 
Televerket’s investments was not endorsed in this document. The socialist government headed 
by Olof Palme, which succeeded the coalition government in 1982, pursued the policy 
established in the 1980 government bill. During the 1980s, it sought to open up competition in 
telecommunication equipment and services, by gradually diminishing the monopoly sector of 
Televerket. Telex-equipment was omitted from the monopoly sector in 1984, telephones in 
1985 and private branch exchanges in 1988/89. In 1988, the government made the decision 
that Televerket’s monopoly in equipment and services was to be removed completely, which 
was put into effect in 1989 (Lernevall and Åkesson 1997, Karlsson 1998).  
As to the liberalisation of telecommunication infrastructures, the course of events progressed 
somewhat differently. According to Andersson (1999), the first private mobile network in 
Sweden was set up in 1964. In the subsequent years, a few other local networks were 
established as well. The only constraints to new entrants in this sector were 1) the limited 
availability of radio frequencies, and 2) the necessity for a permit to connect a mobile network 
automatically to the public telephone network (Karlsson 1998). Televerket was in charge of 
the implementation of these issues, which it enforced restrictively, and Televerket was 
therefore virtually a monopolist in this sector as well. However, in 1981, after a series of 
petitions, refusals and complaints, a company called Comvik AB was granted permission, 
through a government decision, to become the second national mobile operator in Sweden in 
competition with Televerket. Televerket opposed this decision, and during the 1980s, several 
confrontations took place between the two operators. These conflicts involved amongst others 
the “competition authority”, as Televerket in this period played the role both of an instance of 
authority and a business organisation (Karlsson 1998). In 1985, the parliament allowed further 
liberalisation of infrastructures when it decided to opt for competition in the cable television 
market. 
The Kinnevik Industrial Group, which owned, amongst others, Comvik AB, came to play an 
active part in the liberalisation process, by advocating the pre-eminence of free competition 
over the earlier regime in telecommunication infrastructures. On behalf of the group’s many 
companies, they repeatedly challenged the prevailing regulations of Televerket’s monopoly 
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sector during the 1980s. Gradually, as the monopoly sector was reduced, Kinnevik claimed 
the right to offer additional services in the field of telecommunications. In 1988, another 
Kinnevik company, Comvik Skyport (later Tele2, now a major operator) received permission 
to establish an international business telephone service between Sweden and USA, based on 
satellite communication. In the following years, two other companies, Comviq GSM (1988) 
and Europolitan7 (1990), were given licences to operate digital mobile systems in competition 
with Televerket (Andersson 1999).  
Separation of authority and control in Televerket 
The organisation of Televerket as a public enterprise was made an object of analysis several 
times prior to the 1980s, but no changes were carried out at that time. However, following the 
successive reduction of the monopoly sector, it became clear that the integration of business 
and control in Televerket was a problem for development of the telecommunications market 
in Sweden. The Kinnevik Industrial Group called attention to this instance several times, with 
reference to the question of fair competition. Hence, the amalgamation of authority and 
business in Televerket became an issue in the political debate on telecoms, and the structural 
separation of these functions was carried out progressively during the 1980s and 1990s, 
starting with the establishment of Avdelning P. According to Ingelstam (1991), being 
organised as a public enterprise conferred many advantages on Televerket, in particular 
regarding control of  priorities regarding the running expenses of the organisation.  
Since most of the Swedish expertise in telecommunications technology was assembled in 
Televerket, the public enterprise form allowed Televerket substantial control in most areas of 
telecommunication, particularly with respect to technological issues. This never seemed to be 
a problem as long as Televerket held the status of a public monopolist. In 1989, following 
many complaints regarding Televerket’s bias in favour of own interests, both in connection 
with equipment and infrastructure competition, the government decided to establish a national 
telecommunications council (Statens Telenämnd, STN). STN took over the responsibilities of 
the two above-mentioned agencies in 1990, and it assumed the function of frequency 
administration in 1992 as it was converted into the National Telecommunications Agency 
(Telestyrelsen) (Karlsson 1998).  
Finally, in 1993, when Televerket changed its organisational status to a state-owned limited 
liability company, the separation of business and authority was completed. Telestyrelsen was 
then placed in charge of the previous activities of STN, licensing activities previously 
administered by Televerket as well as standardisation activities and general regulation of the 
competition in the sector. Altogether, the changes made in the authorities relations to 
Televerket made the Swedish telecom sector the most liberalised in Europe at the time. Below 
is a comparison between Sweden and the EU in 1993 with respect to the state of the 
liberalisation process in the Telecommunication sector. 
 
7 Europolitan was originally named NordicTel 
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Products and services EU (exl. UK) Sweden 
Terminals Free market Free market 
Telephony services Monopoly Free market 
Third-party traffic (telephony) Restrictions/ ban Free market 
Data communication services  Free market, latest - 96 Free market 
Third-party traffic (data com.) Free market, latest - 96 Free market 
Value added services Free market Free market 
Satellite communication Limited freedom Free market 
Mobile telephony Monopoly/duopoly Free market 
Setting up physical networks Monopoly Free market 
Cable TV Geographical monopolies Free market 
Separation of business and authority Completed Completed 
Fig: Telecom policy in the EU compared with Sweden – 1993 Source: Telia Annual report 1993        
 
Corporatisation of Televerket and the first Swedish law of telecommunications 
The decision to create Teleinvest signalled that the government had accepted Televerket’s 
vision of the new challenges for the telecommunications sector, and represented the first 
serious step in the process of corporatisation of Televerket. This finally culminated in 1993, 
by the transformation of Televerket into a wholly state-owned limited liability company, 
named Telia AB.  
In 1988, the government had initiated another inquiry regarding the organisational status and 
responsibilities of Televerket, in which Televerket was well represented. Unfortunately, many 
participants in the working group died in an air crash in 1989, and the work was temporarily 
impeded (SOU 1990:27). In 1990, the work was completed and it concluded that Televerket 
had both a regional and social responsibility, regarding the fundamental objective of 
providing telecommunications, primarily telephony, to all citizens. It was furthermore stated 
that Televerket would be better equipped to face the challenges posed by developments in 
telecommunications technology and markets if the organised as a limited liability company 
(SOU 1990:27, Lernevall and Åkesson 1997). Based on this inquiry, the government decided 
in 1992, to convert Televerket into a wholly state-owned limited liability company, Telia AB, 
on the 1st of July 1993. During 1992, Televerket was obligated by the Swedish government to 
pay a one-time sum of SEK 5 billion to the state treasury, as well as to buy out a state loan of 
SEK 2.2 billion. 
In a 1991 government decision, regarding interconnection to the public network, the new non-
socialist coalition government stated that Televerket must allow third party traffic on this 
network. Following this decision, the Kinnevik industrial group decided to establish Sweden’s 
second national operator on fixed telephone services, and Comvik Skyport was renamed Tele2 
for this mission. Finally, in 1993, conditions for the regulation of the various telecom 
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operators’ activities were assembled in Sweden’s first law of telecommunication. According 
to Lernevall and Åkesson (1997), the law specifically highlighted its neutrality in competition 
matters and stated that telephone tariffs were to be decided by the respective telecom 
operators according to own costs, and that these must be open to public examination. 
However, telephone services via the public network were prescribed not to exceed a certain 
cost.  
4.1 Technological strategies 
Televerket had a long history in R&D and technology development. In 1918, 
telecommunications technology involved telegraphy and telephony, but during the years to 
come, the field telecommunications evolved to comprise increasingly more complex and 
diverse technology. As described above, the establishment of the industrial division in 1891 
allowed Televerket to be active in telecom technology research, and over the years, the 
administration was involved in various R&D projects. Between 1918 and 1980, the research 
agenda constituted, amongst others: automatic, and later, electronic telephone switches, 
private branch exchanges, mobile telephone systems, television, radio links, telefax, computer 
networks and data transmission, the potential of satellite technology, cable TV and alarm 
systems, as well as the contingency of computer-monitored telephone exchanges (Karlsson 
1998, Lernevall and Åkesson 1997). Additionally, new technologies including telex, 
computers, transistors, trans-Atlantic telephone cables, colour television, satellites, mobile 
telephone systems, data transmission via modem (Datel) and a paging system (MBS) 
(Karlsson 1998, Tahvanainen 1993). Moreover, both L M Ericsson and Televerket introduced 
several innovations in this period. Many of these inventions came into being because of the 
on-going automation of the fixed telephone network, either directly as a response to demands 
arising in the automation process, or indirectly, as the automation process represented a 
starting point for further research, for instance in relation to the upcoming digital technology.  
In the 1970s, R&D activities in Televerket were generally carried out in the individual 
divisions according to their fields of specialisation. In particular, the technical division and the 
radio division represented major contributors of R&D to the organisation. Additionally, 
Televerket performed considerable R&D in co-operation with L.M Ericsson in the joint 
development enterprise ELLEMTEL. In 1981, Televerket initiated an operation named 
Teldok, which was intended for documentation and publication of information regarding 
telecommunication technologies in working life. According to Lernevall and Åkesson (1997), 
research work produced by Teldok was available to the public free of charge and much of it 
constituted the basis for Televerket’s strategic decisions. After the corporatisation in 1993, 
Telia took over the Teldok activities, which are still major sources of information on telecom 
technology and market issues.  
The 1983 establishment of Avdelning [Department] P represented the first effort to centralise 
R&D activities in Televerket and was constituted by merging existing research units in 
Televerket, mainly sections from the technical division. Avdeling P had three main objectives. 
Firstly, it coordinated the research operations of Televerket. During the 1980s, Televerket had 
increasingly come to participate in international research and development projects. Hence, 
one of the chief assignments of Avdelning P was to act as a central coordinating unit for 
Televerket’s research activities. Secondly, Avdelning P was responsible for testing, 
documentation and approval of telecommunications equipment produced at Televerket’s own 
manufacturing plants, and after 1985, the testing of equipment from other suppliers. 
Avdelning P was also in charge of the standardisation and patenting activities of Televerket. 
Thirdly, Avdelning P was carrying out its own research within various fields of 
telecommunication as well, although it was not the only R&D unit at the time.  Research in 
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for instance mobile technology was not included in the operations of Avdelning P, but was 
carried out in a separate branch placed under the radio division. In 1991, Televerket 
established a separate research company, Telia research, which comprised Avdelning P and 
all other research departments of the organisation. 
International and Nordic co-operation 
Nordic co-operation in the field of telecoms has existed for a very long time, a fact which 
became extremely important in the development of mobile telephony. In fact, as early as 1855 
the DGs of the Swedish, Norwegian and Danish telegraph administrations met and discussed 
common business matters, and from 1916, Nordic telecom conferences were arranged 
(almost) annually (Heimbürger 1968). In the 1960s and 70s, the Nordic countries undertook 
several co-operative telecom projects, headed by the national telecom operators. In the 
introduction to Lernevall and Åkesson (1997), Bertil Bjurel8 highlights three instances in 
which the joint Nordic effort was decisive. Firstly, the collaborative work which resulted in 
the establishment of a Nordic satellite station in Tanum (Sweden) in 1971. Secondly, the 
Nordic co-operation in the development of a common Nordic computer network, the datex-
network, which was put into commercial use in 1981. And finally, the joint effort in mobile 
telephone technology development, leading to the launch of the Nordic Mobile Telephone 
standard, NMT, in 1981. 
ELLEMTEL 
From the 1930s, Televerket also participated in co-operative R&D with LM Ericsson on 
mathematical optimisation of telecom systems, which was intensified during the 1950s and 
1960s  (Lernevall and Åkesson 1997). However, the major breakthrough of Televerket, and 
indeed Ericsson, regarding the development of digital technology, followed the establishment 
of ELLEMTEL Utveckling AB in 1970. ELLEMTEL was a joint venturefor R&D and 
production between Televerket and LM Ericsson and represented a contractual continuation of 
the long tradition of research collaboration between the two. Early in the 1950s, subsequent to 
the advances in microelectronics and the invention of semiconductors and integrated circuits, 
Ericsson had started a new research project utilising this technology to develop an electronic 
telephone switch. Televerket commenced a similar project a few years later, in 1963 
(Tahvanainen 1993). Allegedly, these projects were more complex and resource consuming 
than expected, and a joint effort between the two seemed plausible (Karlsson 1998). 
Consequently, ELLEMTEL was established with the main objective to use and improve 
existing electronic switching technology to develop computer-controlled telephone exchanges, 
which later became known as the AXE technology. In 1976, the first AXE 10 exchange was 
ready for trial, and in 1980 the first AXE stations was put into regular service  (Tahvanainen 
1993). So by the 1980s, Sweden had the highest telephone density in the world (Tahvanainen 
1993), but was also was at the vanguard technologically both in mobile radio communication 
and in research of data transmission and electronic switching systems. 
Technological integration and diversification 
Major changes occurred in telecommunications technology all over the world in the 1980s. 
The advances in microelectronics rendered possible a large-scale usage of digital technology 
to improve and replace existing systems. The economic potential of microelectronics in this 
respect contributed to the increased research and development regarding its areas of 
application, which turned out to be fundamental to innovation in telecommunications. Hence, 
in the 1980s, integration of the previously independent segments of the computer and 
telecommunications technologies emerged in a very rapid pace. This again fuelled 
 
8 CEO of Televerket from 1966 to 1977. 
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technological diversification, in terms of numerous new technologies and services in the 
intersection of telecommunication and computing, and thus, the general competition in these 
areas (McKelvey, Texier and Alm 1998). 
Televerket became aware of the importance of having a competitive strategy resting on the 
convergence of telecom and computer technology, at an early stage. They acted to promote 
liberalisation, through several proposals to the public authorities, as a means of facing the 
novel challenges of the Swedish telecommunication industry. Thus, widespread technological 
development, hand in hand with liberalisation of telecom regulations, characterised the period 
between 1980 and 1993 in Sweden, which began with a conservative government coalition in 
command. In the 1980s Televerket’s main strategies seemed to be constituted by researching 
the potential of data transmission, mobile communication and satellites and it was involved in 
international standardisation activities in all these matters. 
Mobile telecommunication 
The 1980s was the era of the pan-Nordic NMT standard, which was launched in the Nordic 
countries in October 1981, as NMT 450. In 1986, at the same time as NMT 900 was released, 
Televerket introduced the mobile text communication service, Mobitex. Mobitex was a 
mobile messages service based on the mobile radio network (MRT) developed in the 1970s. 
Mobitex expanded very modestly in the beginning and the service did not gain a surplus in 
Televerket until 1993. Furthermore, Mobitex may be seen as a precursor to the Short 
Messages Service (SMS). In 1993, the two NMT systems had more than 770 000 (263 100 
and 511400 respectively) subscribers (Karlsson 1998), and Sweden had the highest mobile 
phone penetration rate in Europe with about 7% (Hommen and Manninen 2001). The relative 
success of mobile telephony in the early years after the introduction may be one reason why 
Televerket in Sweden apparently had more confidence in the potential of this new technology 
than the PTTs in the other Nordic countries seemed to have. Hence, before the development of 
the first NMT system was completed, Televerket was already considering the development of 
the digital mobile telephone standard, which later became known as GSM9. GSM was 
introduced in Sweden in 1992. In relation to the standardisation work on GSM, Televerket 
was involved both in the work of CEPT (Conférence Européenne des Administrations des 
Postes et Télécommunications), later ETSI (European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute). 
Data communication 
Even though the oldest means of telecommunication, namely the telegraph, was decreasing in 
the 1980s, Televerket was still involved in the development of text communication 
technology (Tahvanainen 1993). During the end of the 1970s, the magnitude of data 
communication (Datel) had increased, and Televerket responded to this by developing a 
public data transmission network and then introduced an array of new public services. In 
1980, Televerket introduced Telefax. In 1981 they were featuring Datex, which was a data 
transmission service based on circuit-switching technology. In 1983, Teletex, an improved 
version of the telex, was in commercial use (Tahvanainen 1993). In 1981, Televerket also 
offered a nation-wide packet-switched service of data transmission called Telepak. Televerket 
expanded and renamed this service Datapak in 1984, apparently with the intention of building 
a public packet-switched network (Karlsson 1998).  
ELLEMTEL was heavily involved in most of the research activities behind all these new 
inventions in data and mobile communication. Finally, in this period, other services such as 
 
9 Global System for Mobile communication, previously Group Spécial Mobile 
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“heta linjen”10, “conference-TV” for business meetings, Text-telephone for hearing-impaired 
persons and a wide range of telecommunication consultancy services. 
Satellites 
In relation to both data transmission and mobile communication, satellite technology was a 
separate research area in Televerket; it began in earnest the early 1980s. In the 1970s, there 
had been discussions on the political level regarding Nordic co-operation in space and, in 
particular, of a Nordic satellite test-project, TELE-X. Subsequent to a political decision 1982, 
the Swedish private limited company, NOTELSAT, was founded. NOTELSAT was jointly 
owned by the telecom administrations in Sweden and Norway and had conducted the TELE-X 
project. Even if the enthusiasm on behalf of the potential of satellites was very high in 1982, 
TELE-X ran into problems after a while and it was never realised on a commercial level as 
intended (Lernevall and Åkesson 1997).  
Telia commands a leading position in all telecommunication divisions in Sweden, at the same 
time as the company is expanding in neighbouring markets. In particular, the Baltic regions 
have been an area of priority and today, Telia is active in all Nordic countries and all Baltic 
States. In addition, Telia has operations in numerous countries outside Europe. From early on, 
the main strategy in the neighbouring Nordic countries was to establish undertakings under its 
own management. The first foreign operation set up was in Denmark, in 1994. In the Baltic 
States, the main strategy has been to invest in existing operators in office and to get them 
ready for market competition in advance of the anticipated deregulation. The first investment 
in this area was in Estonia, in 1991. Telia also established itself in Poland as a secondary 
operator in fixed telephony in competition with the nationwide, state-controlled telecom 
operator. In the St. Petersburg region, Telia is a partner in one of Russia ’s most successful 
GSM operators. Today, Telia is involved in the development of 3G mobile UMTS network in 
all the Nordic countries.  
5 Telenor 
Telenor is the leading telecommunications company in Norway, which hosts one of the most 
advanced telecommunications markets in the world: it has the world's highest penetration 
rates for mobile phone, fixed line digital telephony, personal computer and Internet usage. 
Telenor also has substantial international operations and investments, particularly in the areas 
of mobile phone, fixed line digital telephony, personal computer and Internet and Internet 
protocol-based communications services, satellite services and pay television services. 
5.1 History in brief 
Telegraphic service was established in Norway in 1855 under the name Telegrafverket, and 
the first telegraph line was opened soon after.11 In 1968, the organisation of Telegrafverket 
was changed, when the central administration was moved from the Ministry Posts and 
Transport and converted into an independent state enterprise with its own board. This change 
implied that the agency was formally more independent than before, and in the process 
Telegrafverket changed its name to Televerket. The research institute of Televerket, 
 
10 A telephone service where several people can talk together at on a line the same time. 
11 The Norwegian Telegrafverket has had several names throughout the time of existence. In the period from 
1855-1919 the agency had several names: Telegrafvæsenet. Statstelegrafen, Rikstelegrafen and Telegraphværket. 
1919- 1933: Telegrafvesenet, 1933-1969: Televerket, 1969-1994: Telegrafverket, 1994-: Telenor AS. In this 
paper Telegrafverket will be used when we describe the period before 1933, Televerket will be used in the period 
1933-1994 and Telenor from 1994.  
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Televerkets Forskningsinstitutt (TF), was also established at that time. Previously, Televerket 
did not conduct any in-house research and development. In 1971-1977, the regional division 
of Televerket was reorganised. Before it consisted of 12 districts and 150 local administrative 
units, which were shifted into a new structure of 7 tele-regions and 27 tele-areas. 
On the 6th of May 1985, Parliament decided to alter the organisation of Televerket again, a 
reform that was formally implemented from the 1st of January 1988. The decision implied 
that the organisation and operations of Televerket was divided into three parts: Firstly, there 
was an administrative unit, Statens Teleforvaltning (STF), which was concerned with control 
and licensing activities, reporting directly to the Ministry of Communications 
(Samferdselsdepartementet). Secondly, a competitive organisation was established, 
Televerkets Bedriftsinterne Kommunikasjon (TBK AS), which was supposed to be relatively 
autonomous and direct its operations towards a limited part of the telecommunications 
market. Finally, the rest of the monopoly sector was  to continue to have the status of a public 
enterprise like the former Televerket. 
In practice, this meant that part of Televerket’s monopoly sector was eradicated in January 
1988, by the opening for competition in, amongst others, user equipment and cable TV. From 
1989, Televerket was also allowed to compete in the market for value added services. In 1994 
Parliament decided to convert Televerket into a state-owned public limited liability company, 
which took place in November the same year.  In early 1995, Televerket AS changed its name 
to Telenor AS, with a new and business oriented organization structure. Telenor established 
seven main business areas: Telenor Bedrift AS (business market), Telenor Privat (private 
market), Telenor Nett (networks and network products), Telenor International AS, Telenor 
Plus AS (holding company for value-added services (VAS) companies), Telenor Mobil AS 
and Telenor RNT (Regulated Network Services) for ONP (Open Network Provision) 
products. 
In 1993, the EU decided that the telecommunications market was to be opened for full 
competition by January 1st 1998. Via European Economic agreement, this decision became 
valid also for Norway and from that date, the telecommunication market in Norway was 
completely deregulated. On the 4.December 2000, Telenor went public and was listed for the 
first time on the Oslo Stock Exchange and on the NASDAQ in New York, USA. The Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) recorded the largest number of private shareholders in Norwegian 
history. The stock debuted at NOK 42 per share, giving Telenor NOK 15.6 billion, or USD 
1.7 billion, in fresh capital. 
5.2 Structures of corporate governance 
Central problems and actors related to the development of Televerket’s organisation form.  
Televerket was established in 1855, subsequent to a parliament decision in 1854. From the 
start, the organisational form of Televerket has been subject to public debates. Following 
several revisions of the public enterprise model, Televerket was converted into a state owned 
limited liability company, Telenor, in 1994 and in 2000, Telenor was partly privatised with 
the state as the largest shareholder.  
According to Vatne (1998), three main areas of problems have been central to the 
development of Televerket’s organisation form. Thjese are firstly Televerket’s independence 
with respect to R&D issues vs. detailed governance via the ministries; secondly, a more loose 
connection to the state budget as a means to increase its freedom in economic and budget 
issues; and finally, the question of a more independent role of Televerket outside the 
government administration. The development of the organisation has proceeded through 
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conflicts between four players in particular: The board and management of Televerket, the 
labour movement, the Ministry of communication and the Parliament. 
Televerket’s board and management have since its establishment in 1855 been fighting for 
their independence in investment and R&D issues, independence both with respect to 
ministries and to policy instructions issued from the Parliament and Government. Problems 
with financial support was a problem for Televerket and the demand for freedom from the 
state budget soon became stronger, as this was understood to imply a more business oriented 
direction for Televerket. The unions appeared as adversaries in this issue since they feared 
rationalisation and potential unemployment of their members as a consequence. This view had 
support from government, since communication enterprises were always of importance in 
welfare policy, and had a major symbolic role in  public ownership. 
The Ministry of Transport and Communication, with a micro-managing orientation that 
survived until the 1980s, seemed to be one of the main opponents to giving Televerket more 
freedom in economic and budget issues. It was not until the autumn 1993 that the Ministry of 
communication acknowledged that the organisation form of a state owned limited liability 
company was the only solution of Televerket in the future. Both the Norwegian Parliament 
and Government had a tradition of strict governance and regulation of the industrial sphere, 
and Televerket was from the start used as an instrument to achieve social and regional policy 
objectives. This built on a fundamental agreement in these issues, which crossed the borders 
of political parties and lasted until the mid-1970s. Then came the “Thatcherism”12 of the 
1980s. Along with major changes in the telecommunications market, the tension between 
political governance and freedom of business became increasingly pervasive, which produced 
very different opinions among the political parties regarding the optimal proportion of these 
two considerations. 
5.3 The development of the organisation 
From the beginning, Televerket was organised as a detached directorate, where decisions were 
made independently of the Ministry. In 1926, the central agencies of both the post and the 
telegraph were incorporated into the new communication department in the Ministry of 
Transport. This implied that the influence of the technical board (fagstyret) and the director 
general of Televerket was increased. 
The years following World War II represented a difficult period for Televerket. The war had 
left the telephone network in poor condition since no maintenance or investments had been 
carried out in more than five years. Although the need for capital in Televerket was critical, it 
had to fight for funding on a level with other public tasks. In the 1950s, Televerket was 
organised as a directorate in the Ministry of communication. The labour union in Televerket 
claimed that this was an obstacle to business development and compared the public enterprise 
with the state owned limited liability companies. More freedom and independence would 
make Televerket capable of solving its financial problems and meeting new challenges. In 
1955, the Post and Telegraph commission (Tvedt-kommisjonen) was set up with a mandate to 
examine the most rational and efficient way of organising Televerket. 
The majority of this commission concluded with suggesting a new organisational form for 
Televerket. However, the recommendation of a more liberal solution for Televerket’s 
organisation was not sustained and Televerket continued to be a part of the Norwegian central 
 
12 In Norway this is called ”høyrebølgen” and refers to the change in politics from socialist values to 
conservative/liberal values of privatisation and liberalisation. 
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administration, but with the board and management now organised as a detached directorate13. 
This directorate was named Teledirektoratet. Even if the reorganisation did not imply any 
immediate reforms, it was nonetheless a step in the direction of more independence in 
business matters. 
In the 1970s Televerket remained a public enterprise under supervision of the Ministry of 
Transport and the management consisted of the telecommunication board, the 
communicational council, the Director General, and the telecommunication administration. 
At the beginning of 1980s Televerket’s organisation was the same as in the 1970s, but 
Televerket’s organisation form was again on the political agenda during the state budget 
negotiations the spring 1979. Yet another committee was instituted to evaluate Televerket’s 
organisation and financing, Stette-utvalget. The committee proposed that Televerket should be 
organised as a state owned limited liability company, but the public authorities would not go 
so far as to liberate Televerket. Instead they proposed that the basic organisation of Televerket 
(the monopoly sector) was to remain a public enterprise, but with some extended authority. 
Still, a parliament decision of 1985 entailed a shift in the development of Televerket, when 
parts of the administrative tasks - such as licencing and type approval -  were transferred from 
Televerket to an independent public institution, Statens Teleforvaltning (STF) [State 
Telecommunications Administration] under the ministry of communication. Furthermore, the 
parliament agreed to the establishment of the competitive enterprise, Televerkets Bedrifts 
Kommunikasjon, TBK A/S [Televerkets Company Communications]. Hence, Televerket was 
no longer in charge of approval and regulation commissions and TBK, the wholly owned 
affiliate company, was responsible for sale of terminals and additional telecom equipment in 
competition with other suppliers. Televerket still had the sole responsibility for the 
telecommunication network and installation of telephone subscriptions. However, the 
establishment of TBK January 1st 1988 represented the beginning of the dissolution of the 
telecommunications monopoly in Norway. The subsequent year, further steps towards 
liberalisations were carried through, when competition was introduced on value added 
services.  
Over time, several wholly owned subsidiaries were established to meet the competition that 
followed in the wake of deregulation. The dismantling of the national telecommunications 
monopolies cleared the way for establishment of private network operators and service 
providers. These companies were usually subsidiaries of large foreign firms, and were at the 
outset active in areas such as long distance telephone and mobile short distance 
communications. Gradually activities expanded also to local telephone services, access 
services (including cable television) and several types of value adding services (information, 
trade, email). 
During the winter of 1991, work commenced on devising a new basic organisation structure 
for Televerket. Even though the institution’s surroundings had changed considerably, the 
internal organisation had been nearly unchanged since the since the early 1970s. The new 
reorganisation, during 1991 and 1992, proved to have very significant impact on the whole 
institution.  On January 1, 1993 Teledirektoratet ceased to be operative. The administrative 
core of this organisation, however, continued a new existence under that name Televerkets 
Sentraladminstrasjon. At the same time, a new venture organisation was established under the 
name Televerkets Nye Muligheter [Televerket’s New Possibilities]. The mission of this 
organisation was to help people from the old organisation build competence and find new 
employment opportunities, in existing or new enterprises in the telecommunications field.  
 
13 Borten-government 1968. 
 18
 
The split in a commercial part and a public service part was not a very thorough one at first. In 
May 1993 Norwegian Telecom AS was established as a holding company for the various 
commercial businesses, and while the board of Televerket would be the board also for the 
holding company, the CEO of Televerket would be the CEO also for Norwegian Telecom. In 
effect, the two main parts of the new organisation could be run as one corporation. Thus, in 
spite of the fact that Televerket formally was barred from integrating commercial businesses 
in the form of joint stock firms into its basic organisation, a solution was constructed whereby 
the management of Televerket could control all the activities that had originated inside the 
original telecommunications organisation.  
The establishment of Norwegian Telecom can be seen as a tactical move in the progress for a 
more independent Televerket. The implementation of the organisation created a tension 
between political governance and freedom of business. With the same CEO and board 
represented in both organisations made the whole organisation appear diffuse and disorderly, 
which could not last over time. The new name of the organisation, Norwegian Telecom also 
sent out strong signals referring to freedom of business and a final spurt to a definite 
organisation of the company.  
The European Community decided in 1993 to open for competition also in various areas of 
network operation, the infrastructure part of telecommunications. Deregulation was to be 
effective by January 1, 1998. After a long debate in the Norwegian parliament in November 
1994, such a change was decided, and Televerket became the wholly state owned joint stock 
company, Telenor in 1995. 
Telenor wanted to profile itself as a new company, with a stronger commercial orientation. 
New organisational changes were implemented, and organisational units serving a total of 
seven main business areas was established: Telenor Bedrift AS (for the business market), 
Telenor Privat (private consumers), Telenor Nett ( networks and network product), Telenor 
International AS, Telenor Plus AS (a holding company for value-adding services companies), 
Telenor Mobil AS (cellular phones) and Telenor RNT  for ONT (Regulated network services 
for open network provision) products. 
As regulatory changes became effective on January 1, 1998, Telenor still consisted of the 
holding company Telenor AS with subsidiaries serving these main business areas, each 
subsidiaries encompassing several divisions and daughter companies: the overall scope of 
Telenor expanded dramatically. 
5.4 Telenor goes public 
On 4 December 2000 Telenor went public. Telenor was listed for the first time on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange and simultaneously on the NASDAQ in New York, USA. The IPO recorded 
the largest number of private shareholders in Norwegian history. The stock debuted at NOK 
42 per share, giving Telenor NOK 15.6 billion, or USD 1.7 billion, in fresh capital and was 
valued at NOK 74 billion. 
What happened prior to the IPO? 
In 1994 the former government corporation Norwegian Telecom was transformed into the 
limited company Telenor AS, wholly owned by the Norwegian state through the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications. In 1998 and 1999 there were efforts toward a possible merger 
between the Norwegian Telenor AS and Swedish Telia AB. The aim was to partially privatise 
the merged company through a stock exchange listing in Oslo and Stockholm - and perhaps 
other stock exchanges. In mid-December 1999 the two owners - the Norwegian and Swedish 
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states respectively - decided to cancel the merger process, for reasons that will be discussed 
further below.. After that the Norwegian government proposed to partially privatise Telenor 
AS through a stock exchange listing - during 2001 at the latest - preferably in autumn 2000.  
In June 2000 the Storting passed a resolution to partially privatise Telenor AS. This resolution 
involved the state initially reducing its stake by 15-25%. At the same time the Government 
was authorized to undertake further sales of shares, provided that the state's stake was at least 
51%. The partial privatisation took place through a combination of an increase in capital 
(share issue) and sale of the state's shares (dispersion sale). The Government evaluated several 
models, before the final one was proposed and then adopted by the Storting. 
In connection with the stock exchange listing, the Storting expressed its desire for broad 
ownership in the listed Telenor. For that reason private individuals were offered a discount 
arrangement through bonus shares following special rules. At the same time a separate 
arrangement was adopted for Telenor employees. For institutional investors there were special 
allotment rules, among which were related to any over subscription. 
As a consequence of the authorities' desire for broad ownership, Telenor shares were to be 
marketed actively in Norway. A comprehensive sales campaign vis-à-vis the private market 
was launched in November 2000. At the same time the management of Telenor held a series 
of open meetings in Norway - and made presentations to the professional market in several 
countries. In advance of the actual stock exchange introduction on 4 December approx. 
53,000 private individuals subscribed, of whom about 5500 were Telenor employees. Telenor 
thereby became the company on the Oslo Stock Exchange with the most private individual 
shareholders. Approx. 7.5% of shares, totalling NOK 100 million, was allocated to private 
individuals.  
At last Telenor and the Norwegian state had identical interests concerning the organisational 
structure, based on the partial privatisation of the company. From Telenor's side there was an 
intense desire to strengthen the company's financial foundation, to meet both long and short-
term market challenges - in the domestic market as well as internationally. The authorities 
pointed out, among other things, that continued 100% state ownership would mean 
disadvantages for Telenor in the competitive market taking shape in the telecom sector, with 
restructurings, alliances, and joint ownership. By 2000 almost all formerly state-owned 
companies were completely or partially privatised. The authorities also by now shared the 
view of Telenor management that in order to keep and develop the strength necessary to 
maintain a leading position in Norway, the company has to grow abroad. The view was that 
this required access to the capital amrkets that could only be assured by privatization.  
5.5 Research and development in the long run 
In 1967 Televerkets Forskningsinstitutt (TF) [Televerket Research Institute] was established, 
as a research unit for civilian telecommunication. There is a long debate on what caused the 
establishment of TF in 1967, but Oland (1992) argues that “…in the final resort it was the 
recognition of an increasingly stronger need for competence within the telecommunications 
sector in the 1960s, which was decisive for the establishment ….” (s.183)14. TF has since its 
establishment become a central player in the development of the telecom sector in Norway. 
 
14 Translation is done by authors. For a more comprehensive discussion see (1992) or Collet and Lossius (1993) 
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The first technology areas 
From the outset, TF selected three areas and technology platforms for research. Tehse were 
data communication, pulse-code modulation (PCM), and switching. In each areas it was faced 
with an expected technological revolution. As to the transmission of data, there was probably 
no tangible need for it at the time, but the experience of the USA showed that transmission via 
public networks might become a major service opportunity in the future. PCM and the field of 
data communication were together crucial for the digitalisation of the telecommunications. 
Through the PCM technique voice signals would be available in digital form, which primarily 
would benefit the transmission technique (Collet and Lossius 1993, s.59). 
Regarding switching technology, automatic stations were already in use. In other countries the 
work on digital switches was already about to develop from the stage of experiment to 
practical application (Collet and Lossius 1993, s.61). In this field it was important to draw on 
competence from outside and TF entered into collaboration with Institute for telephone 
technique at the Norwegian Technical University and ELAB, to build up a competence 
environment within computer-controlled switches.  
In order to plan and develop the telecommunications network of the future it was vital that 
Televerket had competence in all core knowledge fields. So in 1969, a research group in “tele-
traffic” was established as a means to achieve a better foundation for decisions regarding the 
optimal structure and dimension of the network. In 1971, a new group was added to TF, to 
work with operation analysis. This was a direct response to the challenges of developing 
methods and instruments for planning and management of Televerket. Satellite 
communication also became an area of research at TF at a very early stage and was soon to 
become an important part of the institute. The field became the point of departure for an 
ambitious attempt to gather Norwegian industry and research into a joint development project, 
which must be regarded among the most advanced projects in telecommunications at the time.  
In the early 1970s Telenor began work on what would become the world’s first satellite-based 
telecommunications system for the oil industry. It was driven by the need for reliable 
communications between the Ecofisk offshore oil platform in the North Sea and the mainland. 
Despite scepticism from many in the industry, Televerket’s scientists managed to develop a 
satellite-based telecommunications system that opened for business in May 1976. Using the 
NORSAT system, Telenor linked the oil industry with Norway’s main telecommunications 
network.  
Ship-to-shore 
Another example of Televerket’s resourceful approach to problem solving can be found in the 
marine industry. In the 1970s, Norway’s merchant fleet was the third largest in the world. 
Communication was only available via short-wave radio, which meant that ships were often 
out of range for hours, if not days, at a time. Telenor’s solution was to develop the world’s 
first automatic shore station that could be used to communicate directly with ships at sea. 
Countries throughout the world copied the low-maintenance, highly effective, shore stations 
and until recently the original station was the busiest in the world.  
Mobile Telephony 
Televerket was also researching mobile telephony at an early stage. It had been involved in, 
wireless communication for a long time: as early as 1966, Televerket was offering the services 
of a manual mobile system (Collet and Lossius 1993, 72). In 1969, the Telecommunications 
Administrations in the Nordic countries initiated a collaborative project, which aimed to 
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develop an automatic system by common specifications – NMT. In 1975, TF was involved in 
this, due to its expertise in computer technology. Roughly, the division of labour among the 
Nordic countries implied that the Swedish group was in charge of the physical equipment, the 
hardware, while the Norwegian group took care of the software. The NMT-project 
incorporated a distinct industrial policy: the telecommunications operators wanted to 
contribute to the creation of a competitive subcontractor industry. The project succeeded in 
obtaining equipment from Norwegian suppliers, amongst other through a development 
agreement with Simonsen Elektro A/S, which resulted in the manufacture of advanced mobile 
telephones in Norway. This matter will be discussed in detail in the final section of this paper. 
TF was occupied with goal oriented research and development with three main objectives. 
Firstly, it aimed to support Televerket’s capabilities in future multifaceted telecommunication 
needs. Secondly, it sought to strengthen the Norwegian telecommunications environment. 
Finally, TF sought to ensure production of adequate equipment by Norwegian firms. UL was 
to provide for the quality of the services that was offered to the subscribers, and the operations 
thus included all kinds of type control of both the equipment and the telecommunications 
network. In addition, UL participated, along with other divisions in Televerket, in 
international collaboration of development and determination of system principles within 
telecommunication (Annual report 1980).  
At the beginning of the 1980s, the main priority areas of TF were business communication 
and the public ISDN network. In 1975, UNINETT was established as a packet-switched data 
network of Norwegian universities, but it was not until 1984 that Televerket was able to offer 
packet-switched data transmission over the regular network (Datapak). Satellite 
communication was one of the core areas of TF during the 1970s and continued to be so in the 
1980s. The chief interest of the 1970s research activities was satellite communication for 
telephone connection with the Norwegian merchant fleet, the oil installations in the North Sea 
and Spitzbergen. In the 1980s, the interest seemed to be inclined towards use of satellites for 
television transmission and broadband business communication (Collet og Lossius 1993, 
s.140). 
Since the 1980s, the most important area has been the development of GSM. Televerket’s 
engineers and scientists played a leading role in the original design behind GSM, as well as 
building the final specification. Other leading technologies that Telenor has been heavily 
involved in include integrated services digital network (ISDN) and the compression software 
within the MPEG2 standard that makes it possible to distribute moving pictures at lower 
bandwidths.  
Due to its geographical and climatic barriers, Norway had always been deemed to be a poor 
country for fixed-line telecommunications. Rising to this challenge, Televerket saw the 
potential of using digital telecommunications technology to address those issues. Working 
with Alcatel, it developed the world’s first low-cost, automated network service centres. Tasks 
such as maintenance and repair, which would previously have been managed by teams of as 
many as 10 to 15 people, could now be managed automatically from a central location.  
5.6 Research and development contracts 
Behind the establishment of TF laid the expectation that TF would serve as a catalyst for the 
establishment of a Norwegian “IQ industry” (Collet and Lossius (1993, s. 90). There was a 
desire that Norway should develop an independent high-tech industry. The intention was that 
the state, by funding R&D investments in Televerket, particularly in TF, should compensate 
for the shortcomings of competence and capital which were present in Norwegian industry at 
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the time. In addition, this was meant to secure markets for Norwegian industrial products. 
Hence, the use of R&D contracts within telecommunications represented an important 
industrial policy instrument. Nevertheless, there were several problems attached to the 
employment of such contracts. Companies that were selected as contract partners for an R&D 
contract would have an advantage in preference to their competitors. There was also a 
question of whether contrcts could be implemented with foreign-owned firms since there was 
a somewhat nationalistic debate on whether such contracts might be considered as subsidies, 
generating increased competitive advantages in the foreign-owned firms in preference to 
Norwegian firms. Televerket kept in close contact with STK and EB, which were some of 
Televerket’s most important contractors, in spite of the fact that these were foreign affiliates 
relying on foreign technology..  
What emerged was a triangular co-operative network between TF, the industry and the 
Norwegian research institutes. The Norwegian institute sector was to continue basic research 
activities in the fields of its expertise, industry was to develop prototypes and equipment, 
while TF’s role was to prepare the systems analysis based on their insight into both 
technology and future market potentials (Collet and Lossius 1993, s96). On the one hand, 
Televerket was to function as the engineer, and later the administrator of the 
telecommunications network as it was constructed. On the other hand, the industry and the 
research institutes were participating as “joint developers and contractors” (TF’s Annual 
report 1979, p. 6-7.). The most important institute for TF was ELAB and their research, 
particularly within the field of telecommunications.  
Today Telenor R&D is Norway’s largest research establishment within ICT (Information and 
communication Technology). Telenor supports and collaborates with a number of Norwegian 
colleges and universities, among them the Norwegian University of Science and Technology 
(NTNU), the university of Oslo (UiO), the University of Tromsø (UiTø), the Center for 
Technology at Kjeller (UNIK), Agder College (HiA), Stavanger College (HiS), the 
Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration at the Norwegian School 
of Economics and Business Administration in Bergen (SNF) and the Norwegian School Of 
Management (BI). Telenor has also collaboration with the Research Council of Norway. 
Through the ICT-Forum they are together working for a stronger national research 
environment in the field of ICT. This collaboration has resulted in several collaborative 
projects right through Norwegian industry.   
5.7 The continuing Nordic telecom battle 
After the abortive merger between Telia and Telenor at the end of 1999, a major competitive 
struggle emerged in the Nordic telecom market. In July 2000 Telia purchased Norway’s 
second largest mobile operator NetCom with 750,000 mobile subscribers, after strong 
competition with TeleDanmark. A few weeks earlier Telenor had acquired Sonofon, the 
second largest mobile operator in Denmark with over 900,000 mobile subscribers. Telia 
became the largest mobile operator with over 3,7 million mobile subscribers, compared to 
Telenor’s 2,9 million and TeleDanmark which had lost the battle and had only 1,4 million 
subscribers. This means that Telia are the second largest mobile operator in Norway and 
Telenor the second largest in Denmark. A further strengthening of the battle came with the 
merger of Telia and Finnish Sonera by 1 January 2003. 
6. The Finnish Case 
We start the analysis here with a brief sketch of the current situation in the 
telecommunications industry in Finland. We then provide a brief sketch of the history of 
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telecommunications technology and the development of the institutional structure of the 
industry in the country. Then we analyse the organization of telecommunications service 
provision in Finland from 1980 until today. We conclude by looking more in detail at some of 
the more specific aspects of the mobile phones development in the country. 
6.1 Finish telecommunications until 1980 - Institutional structure and 
legislation15 
Finland has long had a complex mix of public and private operations in telephony. At the time 
of the construction of the first telegraph line in 1855, Finland was an autonomous Grand 
Duchy of Tsarist Russia. The Crimean War was in progress. Russian military authorities were 
responsible for construction, and in Russia as in other European countries, telegraph 
operations were an exclusive right of the state. Telegraph districts operated under the Imperial 
Telegraph Office, and in 1864 the Russian Imperial Telegraph Office was completely 
restructured as a civilian authority. The Telephone Statute issued by the Finnish senate in 
1886 meant a division in telecommunications activities: telegraph traffic carried by the 
Russian Empire's Telegraph Office and on the other hand telephone operations operated by 
private companies and co-operatives subject to Finnish administrative control. 
Because the Telegraph Office had functioned as a department of the Russian Imperial 
Telegraph Office between 1855-1917, there were no statutes in Finnish law governing 
telegraph equipment and its use. The deficiency was rectified in 1919 with telegraph 
legislation that gave the government the sole right to build and use telegraph equipment and 
lines. Following independence, the Telegraph Office began to supervise Finland's interests in 
the telegraph field in international co-operation. Finland joined the International Telegraph 
Union in 1920 and the International Radiotelegraph Convention in 1927. 
From the start, certain parliamentary factions demanded that the Telegraph Office and Post 
Office be combined. The Telegraph Office had to operate under provisional statues until 
Parliament voted to finally combine the administrations. The combined Post and Telegraph 
Office began its operations in 1927; at the same time the Post and Telegraph Office's activities 
expanded significantly, particularly in the telephone sector. Besides the Helsinki - Vyborg - 
St. Petersburg telephone line opened in 1914, telephone lines that the Finnish telegraph 
district had built for the use of Russian naval forces during the First World War also came 
under the jurisdiction of the Post and Telegraph Office. 
In densely populated areas, telephone networks had been built by private companies or co-
operatives. The building of the Post and Telegraph Office's first large-scale telephone network 
was carried out during the early 1920s in Lapland, where private enterprise in the telephone 
sector was underdeveloped. During the 1930s, the transfer of all telephone operations to 
management by a government telephone company, as had been done in several European 
countries, was considered. This would have merged the Post and Telegraph Office's telephone 
operations with Finland's approximately 850 private telephone companies. The plans were 
however never realised. 
On the other hand, telephone operations were consolidated through the purchases of smaller 
telephone companies. Between the years 1920-1949 the Post and Telegraph Office acquired 
the equipment of approximately 170 telephone companies, primarily in eastern and northern 
Finland. In 1935 the government purchased the Southern Finland Long-Distance Telephone 
 
15  Sources: http://www.sonera.fi/telegalleria/english/index.html and http://www.thk.fi/englanti/index.htm. 
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Company's network. In practice, all long-distance telephone operations in Finland came under 
the Post and Telegraph Office's jurisdiction. 
The standardisation of the telephone network was however still tied to the question as to 
whether all of Finland's telephone operations would be concentrated under the control of a 
state-owned company. But nationalisation never received sufficient political support, although 
the technical standardisation of telephone networks emerged as an increasingly urgent issue. 
In 1954 the larger telephone companies were ordered to immediately adopt a new set of 
structural regulations for telephone networks. It was however clear that many smaller 
telephone companies lacked the economic and technical resources required for the switch to 
modern telephone technology. This led to the field's consolidation during the 1950s and 
1960s. The Post and Telegraph Office, as well as other large telephone companies, purchased 
the networks of smaller telephone companies. In 1950 there were 687 telephone companies in 
Finland; by 1980 the figure had dropped to 61. During this period the Post and Telegraph 
Office acquired the equipment of 315 telephone companies. 
At that time, the Post and Telegraph Office's dualistic role as an operator and a supervisory 
authority hindered relations between the Post and Telegraph Office and other telephone 
companies. Besides disputes arising in connection with purchases, disagreements also arose in 
such areas as the regulation of data transmission. As a public authority, the Post and 
Telegraph Office demanded that data transmission be carried out within the framework of 
telegraph legislation because data transmission was viewed as the exploitation of a more 
advanced version of the telegraph. On the other hand, private telephone companies considered 
data transmission to be telephone traffic because it was transmitted over telephone networks. 
In a compromise solution reached in 1970, both telecommunications camps were granted the 
opportunity to practice data transmission. 
6.2 Technology and services 
In thinking about Finnish adaptation to modern telecommmunications, it is probaly significant 
that Finland has historically been an early adopter of major telecommunications innovations.  
The first telephone connection was built during December 1877 in Helsinki. Finland's first 
telephone exchange began operating in Turku in October of 1881. During the following year, 
telephone companies were founded in Finland's larger cities. Telephone tests over fairly long 
distances were carried out in the 1880s, with the first long distance connections between 
Finnish cities becoming operational in 1884. Advances in wireless communications were 
made at the turn of the century, and as early as 1900 a radio telegraph connection was built in 
Finland.  
The invention of the vacuum tube in 1906 made possible the multi-channel use of telephone 
lines and audio frequency amplifiers improved audibility over longer distances. Using carrier 
wave technology, a single line could handle several calls simultaneously, which also lowered 
construction costs for telephone networks. In 1922, the first carrier wave systems in Finland 
were used in the Southern Finland Long-Distance Telephone Company's network. The Post 
and Telegraph Office acquired its first carrier wave system in 1929. 
The automation of telephone exchanges began in Helsinki in 1922. Several cities had already 
switched to subscriber trunk dialling traffic during the 1920s and 1930s. The Post and 
Telegraph Office's first automatic exchange came in 1932 with the purchase of Tammisaari 
telephone company. Beginning in 1925, telegraph connections were arranged over telephone 
lines. In the 1930s teleprinters began to be used in telegraph traffic. In Germany and England 
they were connected with exchanges, and the form of business began to go by the name of 
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telex (teleprinter exchange). In 1945, the Post and Telegraph Office began the transmission of 
private telex traffic in Finland.  
In Finland long-distance network cabling was just beginning when the Second World War 
interrupted development. Until the 1950s, Finland's long-distance telephone network was 
almost completely dependent on physical connections and open line carrier wave systems. 
The most important trunk lines were heavily overloaded. Solving this problem began with the 
building of a long-distance cable network in 1953. The decision was taken to use coaxial 
cable systems, and coaxial cables were run through large population centres. This 
accomplished the main goal of cabling, which was to connect a significant number of the 
country's telephone subscribers to a subscriber trunk dialling network. Radar technology 
developed during the Second World War also made possible the construction of radio links 
for voice transmission. In the Post and Telegraph Office's network, the first radio link was 
implemented in 1958. 
The application of digital technology to voice transmission began in the early 1970s. During 
the duration of the call, analogue voice signals were converted into digital form using pulse 
code modulation (PCM) technology. In 1973, the Post and Telegraph Office began using a 30-
channel PCM cable system whose transmission rate was 2 Mbit/s. Subscriber trunk dialling 
began between Helsinki and Vihti in 1955. With the completion of coaxial cables and their 
carrier wave equipment, Helsinki and Tampere, the country's largest cities, could be 
connected by automatic long-distance traffic. The automation of the Post and Telegraph 
Office's local exchanges took place for the most part during the 1970s. The last manual 
switchboard was consigned to history at Pello in Lapland on January 1, 1980. 
Finland's first stored program control exchange was the Post and Telegraph Office's 
international exchange in Helsinki that became operational in 1974. Automatic international 
telephone traffic from Finland began during the same year. The first “modern” data 
transmission in Finland occurred earlier, however, in 1964, when Kesko used the Post and 
Telegraph Office's telex network to transfer perforated tape data between Joensuu and 
Helsinki. The telex network proved to be too slow, however, and data transmission was 
switched to the general telephone network. 
Innovation also extended to early car telephone systems. A nationwide vehicle-mounted radio 
telephone network was being planned from the late sixties, and the Post and Telegraph 
Office's ARP network was opened to traffic in 1971. In 1978 the network covered the entire 
country. At that time there were 16,000 subscribers. Until the early 1990s, the ARP network, 
operating at a bandwidth 150 MHz, was fully manual. 
6.3  Finnish telecommunications after 1980 
During the 1980s, Finnish economic policy was characterised by efforts to foster competition 
and dismantle monopolies. There were of course foreign precedents for this in  
telecommunications, and a process aimed at establishing a corporate structure was set in 
motion in the Post and Telegraph Office's telecommunications segment. 
The Post and Telegraph Office's opportunities to compete were limited during the 1980s by 
the administration's commitment to the state budget. Income was transferred directly to the 
state treasury and funds for operation and investment activities were only allocated at the 
beginning of each fiscal year. In 1981 the Post and Telegraph Office became Posts and 
Telecommunications. In 1983 commercial competition began for terminal devices. Posts and 
Telecommunications allowed customers to acquire their own telephones, auxiliary devices 
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and switchboards provided that the device's connection to the general telephone network had 
been approved. 
The Telecommunications Act of 1987 finally consigned the 100-year old Telephone Statute of 
1886 to history. Commercial telecommunications operations and regulatory functions were 
disassociated by law. Supervisory functions were transferred from Posts and 
Telecommunications to a telecommunications administration centre established under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Transport and Communications. Competition in network 
services began during the 1980s. In 1988 corporate telecommunications and data transmission 
were partially deregulated. In 1990 Posts and Telecommunications became a state business 
enterprise and its operations were detached from the state budget. In 1994 the limited 
company Suomen PT Oy (PT Finland Ltd) was formed. The corporation's company in 
telecommunications was named Telecom Finland.  
In December of 1997 the Parliament approved the partial privatisation of Telecom Finland. As 
part of the privatisation programme PT Finland Ltd was split in two and Telecom Finland's 
name was changed to Sonera. The Sonera's parent company Sonera Group plc was listed on 
the Helsinki Stock Exchange in November of 1998 when the Finnish government sold 22.2 
per cent of the company's shares to domestic and international investors. 
During the 1990s, the major thrusts of Sonera's activities have related to the expansion of 
business activities outside Finland, and the increased significance of mobile communications, 
a development that began already during the 1980s. 
To summarise, Finnish telecommunications legislation encouraged competition by:  
•  Opening data networks and GSM networks to competition in 1990.  
•  Granting competitive licences to long-distance and local telecommunications in 1992.  
•  Obliging telecommunications operators to lease connections to each other in 1996.  
With the recent acquisition by Telia, Sonera is now part of the TeliaSonera Group. 
6.4 Technology and services 
The organizational changes that created Sonera were accompanied by significant 
technological shifts and concomitant changes in services. Following automation, the network 
digitalisation accelerated. Digitalisation had begun in the early 1970s with PCM transmission 
systems. Converting telephone exchanges to fully digital operation began in the early 1980s 
and by 1996, all telephone exchanges in Finland were digitalised. In transmission systems, 
analogue carrier wave systems gave way to digital PCM systems. Field-tests for optical fibre 
cables began in Finland in the late 1970s. In the 1980s optical fibre cables were taken into 
extensive use for connections between exchanges. 
In 1981, as corporate data transmission increased, the Post and Telegraph Office opened a 
public data transmission network (YDV) as a part of a general Scandinavian data network. 
YDV initially offered circuit switched Datex services; this was followed also by Datapak 
packet switching services that began in 1983. Datapak gave Finnish users opportunities to 
access large international information systems and data banks. Its users were primarily 
information retrieval professionals employed by large corporations. In the Videotex service, 
the customer used a terminal to scan information recorded in a database. Travel agencies, for 
example, could use it when ordering and booking services. Unlike the Minitel service in 
France, however, the videotex never achieved a significant foothold in Finland during its 
initial stages. 
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The possibilities offered by the combination of computer processing with the data 
transmission capacity of telecommunications networks were readily apparent, however, and 
these formed an important area of service innovation in Finland. Post and 
Telecommunications' Videotex service's second generation was given the brand name 
TeleSampo in 1988. The number of users grew as the range of services expanded: between the 
years 1987 - 1990 the number of users of Videotex services in Finland rose from 4,500 to 
64,000. Post and Telecommunications also initiated the Telebox electronic message handling 
system within the TeleSampo service network. 
Numerous innovations in telephone sets came  to market when the liberalisation of terminal 
equipment was implemented in 1983. No longer was it necessary to accept the model offered 
with the connection provided by the local telephone company. At the same time, the 
transformation from impulse-based selecting disk telephones to voice-frequency-based touch-
tone telephones was rapid. The enlargement of tariff areas, calculation of call times based on 
shorter metering pulse intervals, as well as the discontinuation of calling categories used in 
manual traffic, meant a reduction in telephone charges. In particular, prices for long-distance 
traffic fell dramatically. Between the years 1980-1990 the number of telephone connections 
increased in Finland by 60%, from 1.7 million to 2.7 million. 
In mobile communications, the saturation of the manual ARP network's capacity was 
foreseeable. A new solution was sought through Scandinavian co-operation. The result was 
the NMT 450 automatic cellular network opened in 1982. In Finland as in the other Nordic 
countries, this network was an immediate and major success. As a result of the network's 
immense popularity, a second NMT network operating in the 900 MHz area was opened in 
1986. A larger bandwidth ensured a multiple channel capacity for NMT 900. Both NMT 
systems are analogue. The NMT mobile telephone network adopted in 1982 extended 
Finland's mobile telephone services to all Scandinavian regions. Automatic telephone call 
transmission was also an improvement over the ARP network. There was also an arrary of 
mobile service innovations: chargeable value added services in the NMT network such as call 
transfer, limited calling and itemised calls in billing. By 1990, the number of NMT 
subscriptions had already reached 226,000. On the basis of this, during the 1990s, 
telecommunications in Finland were characterised by two major developments: the switching 
of mobile communications to the digital GSM network and the breakthrough of the Internet. 
In mobile communications the pan-European GSM network was opened in 1992. NMT had 
provided Scandinavians with experience in international mobile telephone co-operation, but in 
GSM, roaming had to be possible within a clearly larger group. The harmonisation of 
networks and terminal devices was not a simple matter. GSM's digital properties made it more 
than just a telephone. New text message services and even Internet connections further 
integrated mobile communications with other telecommunications modes. 
So the 1990s were the decade of very rapid growth in digital telecommunications services. A 
digitised telephone network, the GSM digital mobile telephone network and the Internet have 
made Finns heavy consumers of telecommunications. With digitalisation and intelligent 
networks, call transmissions have speeded up, the quality of calls has improved and it has 
been possible to diversify the range of telephone service. Services built on intelligent 
networks include virtual networks that connect different branches of a company. In 1996, a 
major number renewal replaced 74 numbering areas with 12 telecom operating areas. 
Competition has significantly lowered the prices of long-distance and international calls 
during the 1990s. Customers are now able to select their operators either by agreement or by 
selecting an operator prefix in connection with each call. 
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7  The evolution of Mobile Telephony – the NMT system 
This section of the paper discusses the role of the telecoms companies in the development of 
mobile telephony in the Nordic area. We emphasize the cumulativeness of this process, and 
the long-term commitment of resources in the face of very significant uncertainty. The 
development of Nordic mobile telephony is an interesting case from a wide range of vantage 
points. First of all the NMT system when it was launched in 1981 was the first major success 
of an analogue cell-based system of telephony with mobile terminals. Secondly it laid the 
ground for later world leading mobile phone penetration and use rates in the Nordic countries 
– thus reliving the century old story about the diffusion of the incipient fixed telephone 
system. Thirdly this development process in the period 1970-90 was the decisive period for 
giving Ericsson and Nokia the basis for their present global positions as suppliers of mobile 
telephone systems and equipment. Lastly, and as we will see, this was attained due to the 
leading and decisive role played by the then generally public telecom utilities. This came 
about not because of Nokia’s and Ericsson’s strategic capabilities – to put it bluntly it almost 
happened in spite of these companies strategic choices and capabilities. 
The history is important in quite concrete ways. The rapid spread of mobile – or cellular – 
phones from the 1990s was based on a century-long historical development, and in particular 
on a very early vision of being able to speak to a specific individual independent of his or her 
geographical location. This section outlines some features of this history, providing a broad-
brush historical background before turning to the main topic – the role of the three state-
owned telecom operators, the Swedish Televerket (from 1994, Telia), the Finnish Posti- ja 
telelaitos (Posts and Telecommunications Office, from 1998 Sonera) and the Norwegian 
Televerket (from 1995, Telenor)16. At the time when this history starts these organisations 
were state monopolies, with variously-defined national interests as their prime objective and 
task. 
Over a period extending of about four decades these national telecom agencies have changed 
dramatically from essentially public agencies providing and closely regulating a national 
service, to general telecom service providing companies. From a status as public agencies they 
are in the course of being transformed to more or less fully privatised companies. During this 
process these organisations have, partly separately and partly jointly, seen the extensive 
development of telecoms technology in a wide range of areas. During the most of the 20th 
century a central issue for these companies, as with all other telecom operators, was the 
transformation of the fixed line telephone system from the original manual system to fully 
automated systems, later into fully digitalised systems. On the basis of radio transmission 
technologies developed during and after WWII, development of cellularly organised mobile 
phone systems became a major concern for these organisations during the 1960s and 1970s. 
The joint development of a Nordic automatic mobile telephony system was initiated three 
decades ago, 1969 and led ultimately to the launching of the analogue Nordic Mobile 
Telephony (NMT) system about ten years later. The 450 MHz NMT system, later 
supplemented with the enhanced NMT 900 MHz system, and the experiences gained with 
these systems, were essential for the development of the European digital GSM (originally 
named for the CEPT group Groupe Speciale Mobile, today Global System for Mobile 
Communications) standard, which in turn leads on to current standards. 
 
16  The Danish telecom operator, today the fully privatised TeleDanmark/TDK could also be included in 
this list. 
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7.1 Mobile communications in the Nordic area 
7.1.1 World leading use of mobile telephony 
Today the Nordic countries are well established as the world’s leading users of mobile 
telephony. By the end of 2000 there were about 17 million mobile subscribers in the Nordic 
countries. The growth rate of numbers of terminals and subscribers has been around 25-30% 
p.a. over the last 3 years, in spite of already high penetration rates. By 2000 the density of 
mobile terminals was more than 650 per 1000 persons in the Nordic area, and nearly 750 per 
1000 in Norway and Finland. By 1999 there were more GSM subscribers than PSTN 
(including ISDN) subscriber connections in some of these countries. Population penetration, 
measured as lines as a proportion of the total population, of mobile telephony is now larger 
than the penetration of fixed lines in Finland and Norway. Thus, the Nordic area is, if not 
saturated, at least thoroughly permeated with mobile phones. 
New user groups, and new use patterns, account for a major share of the growth of mobile 
telephone use. According to one of the GSM operators most of its growth was subscription 
sales to teenagers. However even though the explosion of mobile phones among young people 
has attracted substantial interest, less than 25% of mobile phones in Norway were in fact used 
by consumers under 25 years of age (Statistics Norway, Norsk Mediebarometer 2000). But in 
some of the younger age groups mobile penetration is almost complete, and about 90% of 
some younger age cohorts have a mobile phone at their disposal.  
Mobile penetration in the Nordic area 2000 
Terminals  
GSM 
(1000) 
Total 
(1000) 
of which pre-
paid (1000) 
Terminals per 
1000 pop** 
SMS 
(million 
messages 
2000) 
Messages sent 
pr terminal-
year 
DNK 3 196 3 251 1 126 611,8 752,7 231,5 
FIN na 3 754 na 727,7 615*** 163,8*** 
NOR* 3 234 3 368 1 491 747,8 1 240,5 368,3 
SWE 6 157 6 338 2 773 715,8 494,3 78,0 
Sources: National Telecom Authorities, unless otherwise stated 
* Telecom statistics for Norway 2000 are based on preliminary data, published 21. June 2001 by NPT. 
** Total population, NOR 1.1.2001 (Statistics Norway, 2001), DNK, FIN and SWE data for 1999 
(from Nordisk Ministerråd, Norden i  tal 1999 [Norden in numbers], Nordisk Ministerråd 2000). 
***Finnish numbers:  Total subscriptions Statistics Finland 2001, SMS messages applies to 1999,  
from Ministry of Transport and Communication press release 19.1.2000. For comparison; the number 
of SMS messages sent in Norway 1999 were about 575 mill. messages. 
The dominance of the GSM system is almost complete. The number of terminals based on the 
analogue NMT system has been rapidly diminishing - in 2000 its highest share was in 
Norway, where about 4% of the total number of terminals were NMT phones. The relatively 
high share of the analog NMT system, in particular in Norway, is primarily due to 
geographical coverage: the NMT 450 system still has the most complete geographical 
coverage of all available systems. Hence, while the NMT 900 MHz NMT network was closed 
during 2001, the oldest 450 MHz network will be retained in the future as a supplement to the 
GSM networks. 
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Since 1997 the dominant share of new subscribers are subscriptions with terminable, pre-paid 
SIM cards, ‘cash phones’, the only form of subscription available to teenagers below 18 years. 
The share of pre-paid subscriptions was about 40% in 2000, growing from almost nil in 1996-
97. The large share implies that these subscription forms have found substantial markets even 
beyond the sub-25 years customers. 
During the last four years the number of SMS-messages being transmitted has exploded, and 
passed 1 billion in Norway during 2000, despite relatively high tariffs17, an astounding growth 
of nearly 150% from 1999. Thus, the average subscriber sent more than 350 messages during 
2000. This rather simple add-on feature of the GSM-system, a descendent of the paging 
systems that proved popular in the 1980s for business users, has proved popular outside the 
paging market. Today SMS is predominantly used by young mobile users, 15-25 years old, 
led by female users (Telenor Annual Report 2000). The popularity of SMS-messaging has 
initiated the rapid growth of a secondary entertainment industry, and the introduction of the 
more sophisticated MMS opportunity may generate even more rapid growth in this industry. 
This development exemplifies a key feature of mobile telephony, namely the uncertainties 
involved in predicting the use of services: who would have believed three years ago that this 
rather rudimentary feature of the GSM system would become a multi-billion-euro industry in 
the Nordic countries alone? By the end of the 1990s mobile telephony was deeply ingrained in 
the Nordic population as a consumer life style. 
7.1.2 World leading supply of mobile telecom systems - Ericsson and Nokia 
By the end of 2000 the two Nordic countries of Finland and Sweden hosted two of the global 
leaders in the telecom industry, Swedish Ericsson and Finnish Nokia. According to Dataquest, 
by 2000 Ericsson supplanted Lucent as the leading producer of telecom equipment, due to its 
position in mobile networks (FT, 1 Mar 2001). Ericsson has a 40% global market share in 
GSM infrastructure systems, a strong position in other major mobile standards (as TDMA), 
and was by the end of May 2001 involved 31 of 50 3G infrastructure agreements announced, 
in many cases as sole supplier (FT, 29 May 2001). On the other hand Ericsson has made 
substantial losses on the terminal side, severely impacting the overall profitability of the 
company as profit margins on the system side slips. Its global market share in terminals has 
declined more than any of its competitors; by the first quarter of 2001 its global market share 
in mobile terminals had slipped to 6.8%, Ericsson slipping away from its former worldwide 
no. 3 position in terminal markets. 
The contrast to Nokia in terminal markets is huge. Nokia has continued to increase its lead on 
global terminal markets since the 1995 turnaround. In 2000 Nokia’s market share was more 
than 30%, more than double the share of second placed Motorola. The market share had 
increased to more than 35% by the end of the first quarter of 2001, approaching the goal set 
by Nokia of a 40% market share. As with Ericsson, Nokia is not solely a terminal producer. 
The company also has a viable business in the infrastructure segments of the industry, with 
network operators and service providers as customers. In 3G systems markets Nokia’s target 
is a 35% market share. Its persistently high profitability may in addition to attractive 
technological specifications allow Nokia to devise systems of financing operators’ 
investments in 3G systems at stages where the requirements from licensors to 3G licensees are 
extensive and costly and market potential highly uncertain. According to Dataquest, Nokia 
was the world’s third largest telecom equipment company in 2000, behind Ericsson and 
Nortel. 
 
17  By the end of 2000, Danish tariffs were DKK 0,50, Norwegian ones NOK 1,00 and Swedish SEK 1,50. 
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What has allowed these two century-old companies, located in two countries with an 
aggregate population of less than 15 million, to dominate the global mobile telecom industry, 
when barely 15 years ago both companies were troubled and unfocussed? The attention given 
these companies in the international business press and in the strategy literature focuses 
mainly on the management, the owner structures and the strategic choices made by these 
stakeholders in shaping the commercial success of the companies. Jorma Ollila has frequently 
been described as something of an enigmatic maverick, since his appointment as Nokia CEO 
in 1992. The general consensus is that a main part of Nokia’s success in the terminal business 
is that the company saw early that mobile phones would become a consumer electronics item, 
and that consumer relatedfeatures, such as design, would become decisive competitive factors. 
A similar view is held about Ericsson. The demise of Ericsson’s terminal business was caused 
by the company not seeing this shift. FT recently (FT, 29 May 2001) cited commentators to 
the extent that Ericsson’s phones were held to be over-engineered, Ericsson is “a bunch of 
engineers who couldn’t care less what the phone looks like”. 
However, there is a more basic point underlying present strategies of both companies. Both 
companies, as well as their main competitors, today see wireless communication, including 
mobile communication, as a system technology, across the various related markets for 
terminals, switching and base systems, and transmission. This system approach points towards 
an understanding of what allowed Nokia and Ericsson to rise to the top echelons of the global 
telecom industry. It requires a wider perspective and analysis, however. When the importance 
of a system approach became evident, it was on the basis of the integrated relations between 
telecom suppliers and the national telecom operating companies. The PTOs played decisive 
roles in shaping this, and in allowing the establishment of a technology and strategy platform 
on which the two companies later built their success. 
The system focus is still important in this industry. The extent of Ericsson’s terminal business 
troubles is well known, with Ericsson loosing more than $50 on every one of about 45 mill. 
phones sold in 2000. The danger of financial spillover to the infrastructure part is clearly real, 
“there must come a point when they say ‘enough is enough – this is threatening out real life 
blood’ ” according to financial analyst cited by FT in May 2001. However, Ericsson is not 
withdrawing from the terminal business. Phone production is to be outsourced, employment 
reduced by 12,000, but related R&D, design and marketing is to be retained within the 
company. The establishment of a joint venture with Sony from October 2001 further pulls 
expectations away from imminent withdrawal by Ericsson. According to the viewpoint of 
Ericsson, the reason is simple, a withdrawal would leave the ‘real life blood’ even worse off 
without terminal expertise in the company than with an ailing terminal business. Ericsson 
needs to be able to offer phones and systems; “Ericsson would be at a competitive 
disadvantage if it could not offer operators both phones and systems” according to the former 
Ericsson CEO Kurt Hellström.18 
Our argument in this section is that both the ‘system approach’ of Ericsson and Nokia and the 
ubiquity of mobile phones in the Nordic countries find their basis in the nature of innovation 
strategies, culture and governance of the PTO system. Let us go to the historical background 
for this development. 
 
18  Ericsson is now struggling as well with the delays and reduced expectations concerning the introduction 
of UTMS and 3G telephony world wide. In addition to the misfortunes in the terminal business, this hits 
the stronghold of Ericsson’s position – the infrastructure side. From this point of view – and with 
imminent indications of changes in the ownership structure of Ericsson – the company starts resembling 
a merger candidate. 
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7.3  A brief history of mobile communication19 
A century ago the Nordic economies were rather marginal economies, characterised by major 
out-migration, but also by a vigorous catch-up process involving significant levels of 
technology import. In the late 19th century, these societies were early adopters of telephones, 
and in the 1890s had achieved leading positions in the world in telephone densities. This also 
applied to absolute numbers:  in the 1890s Stockholm had the highest absolute number of 
telephones of any city in the world. So there is a history here, which repeated itself in terms of 
digitalisation of telecom networks, of introduction of ISDN systems and mobile phone 
systems a century later. 
7.3.1 The antecedents 
The world’s first mobile telephone? 
This historical leadership extended to mobile communications. In 1889 the 13 year-old 
Stockholm company L. M. Ericsson & Cos Mekaniska Verkstad marketed a new model 
portable telephone – one of the first portable telephones in the world. The wooden box – 
approximately 40 x 25 x 30 cm – was essentially a rewrapped standard telephone with 
conductors to be connected to available fixed telephone wires. This mobile phone was 
developed primarily to address the needs of one of Ericsson’s major customers in its first 
years, the railroad services, in their need for mobile communication with maintenance work 
on the track. A large number of these phones were later sold to military authorities when a 
lighter, more robust leatherbound version was developed during the 1890s. A substantial 
number of these portables – the early Ericsson mobiles – were sold to British forces for use 
during the Boer War (1899-1902).20 
 
19  There are many outlines of the history and principles of telecom in general and mobile telephony in 
particular, generally in the form of introductory or background essays for a discussion of the 
contemporary telecom business or technology. In addition, most of these, written by US-based authors, 
have a dominant US focus and tend to under-focus on European developments. An un-biased scholarly 
study of the technological, political and social history of mobile communication development is still 
awaited. A recent outline of mobile communication is given in ITU, World Telecommunication 
Development Report 1999, Geneva 1999, while R. Bekkers and J. Smits, Mobile telecommunications: 
Standards, regulation and applications, Artech House Publishers 1999 affords a distinct European 
perspective on recent mobile telecom developments. 
20  A. Attman, J. Kuuse and U. Olsson, Band 1 Pionjärtid - Kamp om koncessioner - Kris - 1876-1932, 
C. Jakobaeus, Band III Teleteknisk skapandet 1876-1976. Both in LM Ericsson 100 år, Ericsson 
centennial history in three volumes, published by LM Ericsson, Stockholm 1976. For an updated and 
more popular history of Ericsson, see Meurling, John and Richard Jeans, The Ericsson Chronicle, 
Informationsförlaget, published on behalf of Ericsson 2001. 
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“No. 390 This instrument may be used for military purposes and at temporary buildings or places 
where it is often necessary to shift it. It is provided with combination-set, two dry cells, generator, bell, 
lighting protector and terminals for line and earth. Weight 9.10 ko.”. Taken from: 4th Edition 
CATALOGUE FROM AKTIEBOLAGET L. M. ERICSSON & Co., STOCKHOLM (SWEDEN) 
1897
 
 
 These innovations readily extended to the first car – or automobile - phone. From 
around 1910 it appears that Lars Magnus Ericsson and his wife Hilda regularly 
worked the first car telephone. After Lars M. Ericsson’s retirement from the firm in 
1901, his wife Hilda wanted to tour the Swedish countryside using another piece of 
new technology, the horseless carriage. Ericsson, reluctant to leave his farm, soon 
realized he could take a telephone along.  
"In today's terminology, the system was an early 'telepoint' application: you 
could make telephone calls from the car. Access was not by radio, of course -
- instead there were two long sticks, like fishing rods, handled by Hilda. She 
would hook them over a pair of telephone wires, seeking a pair that were free 
. . . When they were found, Lars Magnus would crank the dynamo handle of 
the telephone, which produced a signal to an operator in the nearest 
exchange." 21 
These cases have no technological significance for what came later, the solution 
required a manual telephone system based on open wire blocks ‘in the air’. However, 
they illustrate a concern with mobile communications that has persisted for a century.  
Maritime mobile radios 
To find the first mobile radios we need to shift from land to sea. The new instrument, 
with telegrams transmitted over radio link, was soon to prove valuable in maritime 
transport. Radiotelegraphy stations were soon placed aboard merchant and military 
ships, in the UK, in the US and in Norway22.  
Coastal and Maritime radiotelegraphy was a rather immediate focus of Norwegian 
efforts, given its dependence on coastal waters for transport and international trade, 
as well as its increasingly large scale fisheries and whaling, in the Barents Sea, in the 
North Sea and in the Antarctic. When the first wireless link of the national telegraph 
system was opened by Tele(graf)verket in Northern Norway in 1906, it was the 
second permanent wireless link established in the world. This radiotelegraphy service 
was extended to international communication with ships at sea in 1908, with coastal 
radio stations later expanded to cover all Norwegian coastal waters in the North 
Atlantic. These first services, based on medium wave transmission, were based on 
short distance radio. On the basis of the network of coastal radio stations, maritime 
radio telephony was opened in 1931.  
Long distance radiotelegraphy was opened in 1927 with short wave radio from 
Bergen Radio. At the end of the 1950s the functions of the Bergen Radio was 
transferred to the new Rogaland Radio station, soon to become one of the most busy 
high frequency radio stations in the world. A quintessential requirement for several 
of these developments was the invention and development of vacuum tubes. When it 
was realised that the triode vacuum tubes could play the role as detector, amplifier 
                                                 
21  Meurling, John and Richard Jeans, The Mobile Phone Book: The Invention of The Mobile 
Phone Industry, Communications Week International, London, on behalf of Ericsson Radio 
Systems (1994) p. 43 
22  The early Norwegian development of radio telegraphy, telephony and broadcasting is told in 
the 1855-1955 centennial volume for Televerket; Th. Rafto, Telegrafverkets historie 1855-
1955, Telegrafverket 1955. 
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and oscillator, the modern era of radio communication could begin. 23 Bergen Radio 
introduced tubes in 1922 as the first coastal radio station in Europe, at the time when 
the first radio broadcasting stations opened around the world. 
The Norwegian PTO Televerket and its predecessor Telegrafverket was a central 
actor in these developments. Though there are less direct links between 
maritime/ship mobile radio and the ensuing growth of land-based wireless 
communication, than from the development of land/car mobile radio, but they share 
substantial parts of their history. However, at sea there is no obvious role to play for 
the architectural innovation that later proved essential for landbased communication, 
the cellular architecture. On the other hand the links are much more direct from the 
early development of maritime radio communication to an area of communication 
technology where the involvement by the Norwegian tele-cluster later was to become 
substantial on a global scale; in satellite mobile communication. 
The grand unification – radio + televoice 
From these beginnings, telephone development and radio telegraphy, wireless mobile 
communication emerged. But this development was not immediate and direct. It 
required close to a century to accomplish a large scale and viable integration of radio 
transmission and telephony. The process required substantial developments, 
technological and non-technological, it required a co-evolution of mobile 
communication as a technological system with the apprehension of what mobile 
communication was. It required a development of a host of signalling structures, of 
handshaking, of duplexing and multiplexing, in other words the technical innovations 
that are so dense in telecom and signal technology. Land based mobile 
communication would not surpass maritime mobile communication before the 1980s 
in numbers of terminals. 
7.3.2 From mobile telegraphy to mobile telephony 
The start – radio transmission 
The usual histories of mobile telephony starts with the use of mobile radio in the 
fighting of organised crime by the Detroit Michigan Police Dept. during the 1920s24. 
The system was introduced  in 1922, commissioned by Police Commissioner 
William P. Rutledge. Rutledge was “convinced that the automobile had given the 
criminal an advantage in speed that could not be overcome by police cars controlled 
by telephone. Gangsters could make their getaway while the booth patrol was still 
awaiting a telephone call”. Hence the new radio technology promised to be a way to 
catch up with organised crime. 
This first system had just a one-way relay of information and instructions from a 
radio operator at the police headquarters to the vehicles. These first systems were 
another implementation of radio ‘broadcasting’ systems that from 1920 were 
                                                 
23  The tube-based triode of course points the postwar development of micro-electronics; the 
transistor is essentially a solid state triode. 
24  The story is told by K. S. Dobson in How Detroit police reinvented the wheel, published in 
Detroit News (available at http://www.detroitnews.com/history/police/police.htm) 
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initiated around the world, the receivers installed in cars rather than in homes.25 As 
we saw above, by the time of the introduction of the Detroit mobile radio system, 
mobile radio telegraph system had been in use in the maritime sector for two 
decades. The introduction of two-way radio maritime communication predates its 
introduction in land use. 
It took another ten years before two-way radio was introduced, again with police 
services as lead users on land. These systems, and the many similar ones introduced 
around the world in the following decades, were based on a simple architecture of 
one central high-powered antenna in communication with local receivers in vehicles. 
This structure severely limited the usability of the systems, and typically they were 
of interest for organisations where coordination of a large fleet of cars within a 
restricted geographical area. Police, transport services, ambulance services, and taxi 
services were frequent users of these private mobile radio systems.  
In 1930 the success of maritime radio telegraphy in Norway  and the promises of the 
new radio telephony initiated a discussion in the management of the Norwegian PTO 
Telegrafverket of the possibility of establishing an inter-urban telephone system on 
the basis of radio telephony – essentially what became later known as radio link 
transmission systems. 
The second world war had substantial impact on development of many technology 
areas, including radio communication, which could now move ahead into VHF and 
later UHF bands. Both in the US and in Europe experimentation with mobile radio 
and development of local switching systems for these expanded, spinning off from 
rather immediate military purposes. Not surprisingly, several companies that later 
developed competences within the area of mobile telephony had substantial contracts 
with the military on the radio side. A Nordic example is SRA, Svensk Radio 
Aktiebolag26, in the early 1980s integrated into Ericsson as Ericsson Radio Systems. 
Towards mobile telephony 
There are four characteristics of the ‘modern’ mobile telephony systems as they 
emerged in the 1970s that distinguish them from mobile radio. The mobile networks 
were high capacity systems, requiring systematic use of the scarce resource of 
bandwidth. Secondly, these systems were automatic with peer-to-peer 
communication without requiring a central operator or communication centre. 
Thirdly, the mobile systems of the 1970s onwards were fully interfaced to the public 
switched telephone network (PSTN), so a mobile user could call a subscriber to the 
fixed network or vice versa. Lastly, the mobile systems of today are ‘roaming’ 
                                                 
25  Listening to police radio on ordinary radio sets soon became popular. Examples of 
commercial radio receiving sets marked ‘Police’ in the 2 MHz band in this period are 
frequent. 
26  SRA dates back to the 1920s, and for most of its history was owned by Ericsson and the 
Marconi company. Its dominant business up to and through the 1950s was radio sets, and 
with its brand name Radiola it blanketed Sweden with radios (see Attman et al (1976), op. 
cit.). Later the radio set activities were sold off, SRA shifting its prime focus to ‘professional’ 
radio communication generally, and mobile radio communication in particular. 
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systems, allowing the subscriber to access the overall system irrespective of which 
subsystem he or she belongs to27. 
Efficient frequency use required substantial technological development, as well as 
development of national and international regulatory regimes. The first important 
step was the invention of a non-technological, architectural approach to mobile radio 
systems in 1947. Automatisation of mobile radio systems was developed around the 
same time, and by the end of the 1940s the demand from owners of private radio 
networks for connections to the PSTN network increased. The regulatory regimes 
required these connections to be done by the PSTN operator, the national PTO. Here 
too, the idea was current by the late 1940s. The vision of a ‘modern’ mobile 
telephone system thus seems to have fallen into place already by the immediate 
postwar period. However, it took another 20-30 years to the first attempts to 
operationalise this vision. 
Bell Labs was a centre of many of the developments that later proved essential for 
mobile wireless communication. Bell introduced the cellular design of mobile 
systems in 1947, but equally Bell Labs contributed significantly with wider efforts 
into radio technology and solid state physics. However, most of these ideas did not 
become realistic for another thirty years; cellular architecture and frequency reuse to 
enhance capacity of mobile systems, did not come into systematic use before around 
1980. 
The Swedish Televerket was an early mover on the European scene.28 In all countries 
private mobile radio networks were frequent, by the mid-1940s there were about 40 
radio networks in Sweden alone, increasing rapidly during the following years. 
However, few European PTOs seems to have got involved in system development 
and experimenting. The viability of connecting radio systems to the PSTN network 
implied a public radio network, and suggested that Televerket should play a pivotal 
role. In the late 1940s Televerket initiated a project of experimenting with mobile 
telephone systems, aiming at an automatic network for car phones. 
By 1950 the first automatic mobile, non-cellular telephone system had been 
developed, named System Lauhrén after one of the Televerket engineers responsible 
for developing the system as a joint project of the Telephone Technology 
Department (Tekniska byrån) and the Radio Department (Radio-byrån) of 
Televerket. The system was introduced for commercial use in 1955 in Stockholm and 
Gothenburg and may lay claim to being the first automatic mobile system in the 
world.  
The Swedish history continued with a new system developed during the mid-1950s, 
System Berglund, again referring to the Televerket engineer who headed the 
development (Ragnar Berglund had also been co-leading the development of the first 
                                                 
27  The characteristics of roaming are outlined further below. 
28  The early history of mobile telephony in Sweden is told in more detail in av O. Gerdes, 
Nordisk Mobiltelefoni NMT Från trådlös telegraf till mobiltelefon, Daedalus –Tekniska 
Museets årsbok [Swedish Museum of Science and Technology Yearbook] 1991. The 
Norwegian history of mobile communication is summarised in L. Grimsteit and H. Myhre, 
The history of mobile communications in Norway, Telektronikk, volume 91,  no. 4, 1995, 
Telenor, p. 15-20 
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system together with Sture Lauhrén). Though the Berglund system was developed by 
1962, neither the Lauhrén nor the Berglund systemscould be expanded on a large 
scale, both remaining regional systems. 29  The Berglund system was opened in 1965, 
with full transistorisation of radio equipment. Though both systems made it into 
commercial use, and where still in use when the NMT system was developed, the 
possible number of subscribers were limited. 
In 1962 the Swedish Televerket appointed a commission to analyse and to make a 
proposal “with clarification of related technical and economic aspects,  for a suitable 
system for mobile telephone systems”. Though it took another two years before the 
commission started its work, following the appointment of chief engineer Carl-Gösta 
Åsdal of Televerket Radio as chairman, this decision proved decisive for later 
developments in Sweden, and in Norden. The commission included all radio related 
areas under its agenda, and presented by this a platform for the NMT process, as well 
as the later MOBITEX system – a packet switched mobile data service – introduced 
in the late 1980s by the Swedish Televerket. 
There is also a line from the Åsdal commission to the introduction of a radio paging 
service jointly in the Scandinavian countries, based on the CCIR POCSAG-
recommendations. Paging systems allowed short messages, typically telephone 
numbers to be called, to be relayed to pocket sized terminals, the pager, with a small 
display. Paging systems were introduced in Norway in 1984 and Sweden in 1985. 
Pagers proved popular, and penetration rates were soon at the top of European 
rankings. These first systems were analog. A system for digital paging services was 
developed jointly by the Scandinavian PTOs in the late 1980s. 
The geographical position of Norway, its fishing and whaling activity around the 
world and its large shipping activity led there to a larger focus on maritime 
communication. With reconstruction after the second world war substantial efforts 
were put into the development of systems for short range and long range (mobile) 
maritime radio communication. The highly prioritised reconstruction of Norwegian 
fisheries during the immediate postwar period, gave a strong impetus to maritime 
radio telephony. These large scale system developments, partly reflecting the global 
character of the Norwegian shipping industry, its large fishing activity and extensive 
sea transport in coastal and nearby waters, gave the coastal radio telephone system 
and UHF radio stations like Rogaland Radio prominence, even globally. However, 
these systems remained manual systems, though connected to the PSTN network 
through operators at the radio stations.  
With development of NMT ongoing (see below), the Norwegian Televerket also 
initiated the development of automatic maritime radio telephony, based on R&D 
related to the development of NMT30. The objective of this work, started in 1978, 
was to develop a fully automatic coastal telephone system with global coverage. On 
this basis the relevant ITU organisation for radio communication, CCIR, presented 
recommendations for technical specifications for a new automatic system, integrated 
with the PSTN network. This “was a milestone in CCIR’s history” (NTRI annual 
                                                 
29  In the literature, these systems are often referred to by the systematic acronyms they were 
given later, MTA and MTB. 
30  H. Godø, R&D and technological innovations in telecommunications: Innovation regimes, 
Ph.D. thesis Roskilde University Centre 1995 
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report 1981). The global automated system was never implemented, as the 1982 ITU 
World Administrative Radio Conference declined the recommendation to set off 
bandwidth for the system. The experiences in this project nevertheless proved 
valuable; capabilities and results, as in digital signalling, formed one of the bases for 
the GSM-effort. 
More successful was the efforts of Norwegian Televerket to move into satellite based 
mobile communication. Again the global position of Norwegian shipping proved the 
decisive driver. A major system study, Maritime satellite communication – System 
study, was developed in 1969 jointly by two leading Norwegian radio 
communication companies, NERA and SIMRAD, with substantial activity in the era 
of maritime communication.31 Both companies were heavily integrated into the 
‘new’ Norwegian industrial policies that aimed at developing national champions in 
emerging R&D-intensive industries, where the National Defence Research Institute 
and its director were central actors. Both NERA and SIMRAD were at the time lead 
by former NDRI researchers. 32  
The initiative to perform the 1969 study grew out of an explicit national attempt to 
develop a global technology lead in an area where Norway had natural advantages. 
The study was a result of more than a decade of systematic policy and institution 
building of satellite-related research.33 As with NMT, Nordic cooperation was 
established, the Scandinavian Tele Satellite Committee was established with Sweden 
and Denmark in 196134. The Nordic collaboration did not, however, play the strong 
role it later did in NMT and satellite communication. 
The Televerket emphasis on maritime satellite communication gave it a central role 
in the development of the INMARSAT system, providing a global automated 
satellite communication service. The work on satellite communication was an 
international breakthrough for Televerket, with decisive influence on the 
                                                 
31  NERA, with close ties to Norwegian telecom equipment supplier Elektrisk Bureau, and thus 
to Ericsson, was an integral part of the Norwegian telecom, as well as defence, complex, with 
its focus on radio links and communication. Today it is a dominant global company in the 
area of INMARSAT-based communication, and also continues to have a strong position in its 
old area, radio link technology. Its position in satellite communication is mainly due to its 
involvement in these developments from the late 1960s onwards. SIMRAD,  today part of 
Kongsberg Gruppen ASA, was established as SIMRAD – Simonsen Radio in 1947 by a radio 
engineer Willy Simonsen from the Headquarters Defence Command Norway [Forsvarets 
overkommando]. SIMRAD’s main product portfolio included echo sounders, sonars, and 
maritime radio telephony, for the fisheries and for the defence. During 1950-1975 SIMRAD 
was acknowledged as world leader in echo sounders and sonars. Its participation in the 1969 
systems study was an attempt to steer the company into satellite communication, an attempt 
that failed (SIMRAD’s history is discussed in K. Sogner, God på bunnen – SIMRAD-
virtksomheten 1947-1997 [Good at the base – SIMRAD activities 1947-1997], Novus forlag 
1997 
32  There is a wide literature on this period in Norwegian industrial innovation policy, 
unfortunately most of it in Norwegian. For an overview of this and other epochs in 
Norwegian innovation policies, see J. Hauknes and O. Wicken, Innovation policy in the 
postwar period – Trends and patterns,STEP June 2000. 
33  For an account of this and the history of the Norwegian Televerkets R&D institute NTRI, see 
J.P. Collett and B.O.H. Lossius, Visjon – Forskning – Virkelighet – TF 25 år, [Vision – 
Research – Reality – NTRI 25 years], Televerkets forskningsinstitutt 1993  
34  As seen from this and preceding examples, it seems Nordic or Scandinavian collaboration 
was the rule, rather than the exception. 
 
 40
development of CCIR and CEPT recommendations, contributing substantial and 
innovative solutions to ITU. NERA and Televerket developed the INMARSAT earth 
station at Eik in Norway. When it opened in 1982, automatic switching and 
connection to the automatic PSTN were provided for the first time. The development 
work of the Eik earth station has been characterised as ‘beyond state of the art’ 
(Godø (1995), p. 58). Televerket/Telenor has always been a significant partner in the 
INMARSAT organisation, and is today one of the major owners of the incorporated 
INMARSAT (since 1999), with a 15% owner share. In addition Telenor participates 
in INTELSAT and EUTELSAT. 
Although several private mobile radio networks for land use were established during 
the 1950s and early 1960s, it seems that the Norwegian Televerket did not focus on 
the development of such networks before the mid-1960s. Televerket’s role prior to 
1965 seems to have been limited to certification and license issue for private 
networks. In the developments of mobile communication, at sea, in space and on 
land, Televerket’s R&D institute, NTRI, and its research director were core 
intrapreneurial innovation agents in the organisation. NTRI was given substantial 
leeway and strategic influence as a consequence of the harsh criticisms raised 
towards Televerket in the national assessment of industrial R&D performed in the 
early 1960s, a criticism that needed a response. This finds support in the 
characterisation of Televerket’s research activities during the 1960’s given by Collett 
and Lossius (1993). When NTRI was established in 1967, they describe NTRI and its 
immediate predecessors as a “technological pioneer in a backward Televerket”. 
However, Grimstveit and Myhre (1995) indicate that the drive for Televerket to enter 
land mobile radio communication was the interest of private local radio networks to 
expand their coverage area. Uneconomic use of radio frequencies and costly 
infrastructures, as well as an increasing conviction in Televerket of a future market 
for radio telephony for private persons, could only be met with a public radio 
telephone service it was argued. The first manual public mobile system was 
introduced during 1966, a system that was definitely not ‘beyond’ state of the art, but 
which laid the foundation for  a coordinated ‘giant leap’. 
Similar systems were established or under implementation in all Nordic countries by 
the mid-1960s. These systems saw rapid growth in demand and number of 
subscribers, with the consequence of system saturation. Well established formal and 
informal networks between the Nordic PTOs ensured exchanges of these experiences 
and ideas of future developments. The stage was set for the next step – the 
development of the first mobile system with trans-national roaming, NMT. Along the 
way a trans-Nordic manual mobile telephony system was launched in 1976, easing 
the growth pains of the former national systems, and for the first time allowing cross-
border use of mobile telephones; a Norwegian subscriber was able to use her 
telephone in Sweden and Denmark – manually controlled proto-roaming. 
7.4 What is a mobile telephony system? 
7.4.1 System architecture 
Basically, mobile telephony is not a system, it is an interface. It is based on radio link 
between a mobile user terminal and fixed appropriate receivers and transmitters 
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communicating with a backbone infrastructure network system35. This front-end 
interface is broadly speaking independent of what infrastructure is used, but 
traditionally the mobile systems were designed as front-ends for the fixed public 
switched telephone network. Thus, there are four principle functional parts of these 
mobile interfaces, a user terminal or handset operated to get in touch with another 
party located at a known address in tele space (though location may be unknown in 
geographical space) communicating with a radio transmission system, termed the 
base system, a switch receiving contact information from the base system passing it 
on along the right highway towards the correct location, and a gateway to the 
infrastructure (cabled) network used for transmission of signals (which may be the 
PSTN).  
The graphical description of the GSM system given here illustrates this structure. A 
similar depiction may be given for the NMT system, or any of the other 
contemporary digital systems. The overall structure is more or less the same, though 
the distribution of functions across the system and the communication systems vary. 
In the GSM system a substantially larger part of the intelligence in the network, 
required for signal control and processing, has been delegated to the base station 
system, while in the NMT system this is almost purely a radio transceiving 
(transmitting and receiving) system. As is seen from this outline of the gross 
structure, somewhere in the system there must be someone or something keeping 
track of the link between tele-space, in which communication signals live, and 
geographical space in which physical users live. Fixed telephones are no problem, 
they are – fixed – in both senses of location; the tele-space fixed address – the phone 
number – stays put at a fixed physical location – its geographical address. The 
problem is mobile phones, phones – fixed in tele-space – that roams about in 
geographical space36.  
                                                 
35  There is a huge literature, both for the general reader and the technologically more advanced 
reader, on the principles behind and the technological and functional structure of 
telecommunication systems in general, and mobile communication more specifically. A well-
written reference point that combines the interest of the general reader with venturing into 
some aspects of the basic technology is available on the web. Tom Farley has authored a set 
of extensive essays, available at http://www.privateline.com/, see in particular the two essays 
Cellular Telephone Basics: AMPS & beyond, and Digital Wireless Basics. 
36  Both of these systems may roam in person-space; there is no identification of the individual 
user implied. Or in other words, they are independent of who the individual user is. The next 
immediate step is therefore to fix location in person-space (basically by some unique 
personal identifier perhaps allied to social security number), with full roaming in the tele and 
geographical spaces. For some, the glory of 3G telecom is the opening of the path towards 
this goal. 
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The idea of roaming, a crucial aspect of mobile systems, is that the system keeps 
track of the terminal’s physical location. Imagine the base stations on the upper left 
are in Oslo. The communication with the phone of a subscriber living in Oslo is 
controlled by a base station controller and the main switch for the Oslo area; this is 
the subscriber’s home ground. In effect the telephone number of the terminal is 
treated as an Oslo area number.  
When the subscriber leaves on a trip to Paris at somewhere at the bottom of the 
figure the Oslo and Paris GSM switches must both know that phone is now in Paris. 
When the terminal leaves its home ground, the home (Oslo) switching system of the 
terminal keeps a record of where the terminal is at any time (presently Paris), of 
which switching system it presently belongs to. The switching system that is visited, 
the Paris switch, handles all communication with the terminal as long as it stays 
within the territory of this system. The main point for the user about this roaming 
function, the information exchanges and data management it requires, is that the 
terminal may be used at any geographical location that is covered by the system and 
the associated communication standards.  
The core role of a radio communication subsystem in the mobile systems implies 
directly that the early history of mobile telephony is integrated with the history of 
radio communication. The history of mobile radio communication has been a 
continuing struggle to increase communication capacity; to ensure high quality 
signalling, to increase signalling capacity between terminal and radio stations, and to 
increase system capacity to accommodate increasing numbers of users and 
subscribers. The battles fought and won here were crucial to the later possibility of 
launching full-fledged mobile telecom systems. The development of micro-
electronics was decisive, for miniaturisation, for allowing digitilisation, etc.  
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However, there was one severe limitation, the impact of which dramatically shaped 
the development of mobile communication. Radio communication uses a physical 
resource, the electromagnetic spectrum. We are swamped by electromagnetic 
radiation, from natural, as well as man-made, terrestrial sources, and from extra-
terrestrial sources. Basically, any band of the EM spectrum can be used only once, by 
man or by nature, to communicate information at any point in time. The availability 
of wave-bands for communication purposes is severely limited by natural sources, by 
established use by man for other purposes and by the absorption characteristics of the 
atmosphere, all of which vary along the EM spectrum. The outcome is the core need 
to treat available band spectrum as a scarce resource, which with its immediate 
spillover mechanisms raises the need for substantial co-ordination efforts. Hence, 
regulation of band use by the US FCC and similar agencies, hence efforts to develop 
technologies that allow multiple use of the same bands in parallell. 
As all who have listened to long wave and medium wave radio know, different parts 
of the EM spectrum may propagate widely different distances. Some waves can 
spread almost around the world, others hardly reach outside the local neighbourhood. 
This is partly a consequence of the power with which the signal is transmitted, partly 
how the signal travels through the atmosphere. In some bands the atmosphere is 
almost like a perfect mirror and signals can travel far by ‘bending’ around the curved 
surface of the earth, in other bands it is transparent and signals travel in straight lines, 
while in yet other bands the atmosphere is almost opaque, absorbing any signal 
quickly. One substantial advantage of the micro-wave part of the EM spectrum used 
for mobile communication is that it offers a balance between a rapid attenuation of 
signals by absorption and transparency; signals reach ‘far enough’, and they do not 
go ‘too far’. What is ‘far enough’37 depends also on the architecture of the mobile 
communication system, the architecture determining ultimately determining the 
capacity of the system. With communication in a certain band, increasing the 
intensity of the signal (increasing its power) expands the borderline. Shifting to a 
band where atmospheric absorption is higher with the same intensity, the borderline 
contracts towards the source. 
Inside this borderline, within the ‘far enough’ area of a transmitter, each ‘channel’ 
cannot be used more than once (or a suitable multiple given by the particular 
multiplexing technology used) in on-to-one communication. Outside this area, the 
same channel may be used again by another terminal-transmitter dialogue, and the 
system opens up for frequency reuse. This is the basic idea behind a crucial 
architectural innovation in the development of mobile communication. In 1947 Bell 
Labs proposed a cell-based architecture of the communication system to allow 
frequency reuse, and hence increased capacity. Cellular architecture and its alter ego 
frequency reuse, and their later refinements has been decisive for the development of 
mobile telephony, a fact that underlies the US use of the term ‘cell’ phones. 
                                                 
37  There are of course several other factors in these equations. Typical, ‘ballpark’ estimates on 
the basis of ‘simple’, i.e. non-cellular, architectures imply that reliable communication in a 
given channel is limited to within some 30 km,  with frequency reuse severely limited within 
100 km.  
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Mobile systems of today have four key components; the structure of cells, a network 
of base stations and antennas to optimise coverage and capacity, base station 
controllers, or local switches, managing base stations, and the main mobile switch (or 
switches), communicating with the base station controllers, and with the public 
switched telephone network. 
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The basis of such a system is a distributed network of low-powered antennas, located 
at base stations, communicating with the terminals. A cell may then reuse 
frequencies already in use in other cells, sufficiently far away to avoid interference. 
The cell structure, usually depicted as a simple honeycomb structure, consists of a 
cells of different sizes. Cell sizes are adjusted to optimise capacity, with small cells 
in high user density areas, larger cells in more diluted areas, varying from a few 
hundred meters upwards38. The frequencies made available to any base station and 
cell is a complex function of the system architecture and the local topography of the 
geographical area to be covered, to reduce interference, and to enhance capacity and 
signal quality. Increasingly, cell designs are based on a hierarchical cell structure, 
larger macro-cells containing several micro-cells, each of which may again 
accommodate pico-cells. The costs of designing and building this cell-based 
infrastructure is considerable, hence the sigh of relief heard all over Europe when 
first the German Telecom Authority in June 2001, later many others, allowed shared 
investments in base station infrastructures for UTMS licensees. Economic design of 
mobile systems has become a serious issue 
The cell structure raises the need for a further function. The expected number of 
mobiles crossing cell borders increases rapidly as penetration rates increases, and as 
cells become smaller. As the number of cell crossings increases, the number of 
crossings while the phone is used increases automatically. But the whole logic of the 
                                                 
38  GSM cells are typically ‘small’, less than 10 km, while NMT 450 cells are large, up to some 
50 km. 
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mobile system would be destroyed if the user was required to stay within one cell for 
the duration of a call, let alone the information overload it would require for the user 
to know where cell borders were. From the user perspective, the physical outlay of 
the infrastructure should be invisible. The core concept here is the handover 
function, the function that in a seamless way transfers the exchange between the 
terminal and the base station system from one base station to the next as the border is 
crossed. We tend to think of this as a physical border, but in real systems it is an 
efficiency border; the infrastructure determines in real time the handover on the basis 
of maintaining overall signal quality for all ongoing exchanges. 
All these factors, roaming, cell and user administration, and handover, together with 
fully digitalised communication, increased transfer rates, and so on immediately 
suggest rapid escalations in requirements for system overhead, for real time 
supervision and control. As an illustration; while the functional resources of the 
NMT base station system was divided roughly 80-20 between radio communication 
and control functions, the distribution in the GSM 900 base system is approximately 
opposite; 80-20 in favour of control functions. 
Evolution of cell sizes, communication and control technologies, transmission 
power, efficient batteries, etc. have allowed miniaturisation of terminals: yesterday’s 
10 kg ‘dragables’ have become today’s 70 g ‘pocketables’. From half a million 
terminals in use around 1985 to more than almost a billion by the end of the century 
– this is very dramatic growth. As noted initially in this section, systems as NMT and 
GSM are still basically front-ends of the PSTN system. With new backbone systems, 
new system interfaces and with the transformation of the PSTN system into full data 
networks, mobile communication today is perhaps more correctly seen as an integral 
part of a large scale multi-functional communication infrastructure across all data 
types, carrier technologies and terminal categories. 
7.5 The political economy of NMT  
7.5.1 NMT system development 
The NMT history proper opens in 1969. A proposal was made to the Nordic PTOs, 
quickly gaining their support, to develop jointly a technologically leading first 
generation analog cellular phone system, the NMT system. The NMT system, the 
first with multinational roaming, was a tremendous success and is still in use in about 
30 countries around the world (though by today it is drowned by GSM use in its 
heartland). In Sweden NMT based telephony still accounted for about 2% of total 
generated income from all mobile telephony in 2000, PTS (2001). Similar shares 
apply to the other Nordic countries).  
The NMT proposal was made by the director of Televerket Radio (S), Carl-Gösta 
Åsdal, to the Nordic national telecom operators at their 1969 Nordic Tele 
Conference39. Åsdal had just completed the chairmanship of the Swedish 
                                                 
39  The Nordic Tele Conferences were a cycle of high level joint meetings between the telecom 
director generals and their agencies in the five Nordic countries. The conferences considered 
issues of common interest, in terms of telephone charges, development of international 
telephone networks and cable systems, and systems development and other more technical 
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Televerket’s report Landmobil radiokommunikation40, a report which saw mobile 
telephone systems as a particular variant of mobile radio communication, on the 
basis of two decades of experimentation and implementation of mobile telephony. 
The 1967-report became fundamental in shaping the future technical and system 
development of mobile communication. Its proposition of the structure of a mobile 
telephony system was based on a cellular approach and outlined a fully automatic 
system as the only viable path, based on an extensive consideration of contemporary 
mobile systems available throughout the world. 
 
An early outline of the principal structure of the NMT system. Depicted are three 
cells (trafikområde [traffic area] 1-3), with base stations communicating with the 
mobile terminals, cabled to mobile exchanges (MTX 1-2). The exchanges transfers 
signals to the fixed telephone network (fasta telefonnätet) through transfer stations 
                                                                                                                                          
matters. The first conference was held in Copenhagen in December 1917. An account of the 
Nordic collaboration and a shift in emphasis from administrative and policy issues to an 
increasing focus of technological issues during the first 50 years is given in H. Heimbürger, 
Nordiskt samarbete på telekommunikationsområdet under 50 år 1917-1967 [Nordic 
collaboration in telecommunications during 50 years 1917-1967],  Stockholm 1968. 
40  Landmobil radiokommunikation, betänkande avgivet av arbetsgruppen för 
mobiltelefonsystem, [Landbased radio communication – Report given by the working group 
on mobile telephone system], August 1967.  
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or gateways (Förmedlingsstation). The fixed network sees the mobile exchanges as 
‘any other’ local telephone subscriber. 
At the 1969 Nordic conference the objective of developing a joint public land-based 
mobile system was adopted, based on common system solutions. It was clearly stated 
that the objective would require long term work; in fact the whole decade of the 
1970s was expected to be required for completion of a Nordic mobile automated 
telephony system. The work was started in January 1970, with the working party 
NTR 69-5 with participation from all countries, and chaired by Televerket (S).41 A 
first interim target of developing joint compatibility of the existing and planned 
manual systems was chosen as a way towards a fully automated system. When the 
NMT system was launched October 1 1981, it was the first multinational mobile 
system based on a cellular structure, and was recognised as a leading edge 
technological system. By the end of 1981 10 different mobile terminals (not really 
handsets at that time) from several international producers were certified for the 
system, demonstrating a significant interest for this system and the potential it had.  
The development of the NMT system and the related specifications was led by the 
telecom operators, but based on an integral collaboration with the industry. Both 
national and foreign industry was involved in the development process as early as 
1971. The official industrial ‘policy’ of the telecom consortium was to disclose 
information on the system and its requirements to open up for international 
competition on supply of terminals, base stations, switches and communication 
systems. There was a substantial interest from international industry, and companies 
like Panasonic (Matsushita), Mitsubishi and Motorola was involved very early in the 
process 
However the potential of mobile transnational communication in the early 1970s was 
faced with substantial technological uncertainty, and so the task the Nordic 
consortium undertook may be perhaps best be described as co-ordinating 
technological development in the face of considerable and uncertainty., with respect 
both to individual technologies and to the sysem as a whole. 
7.5.2 The Nordic supplier industry 
As we have noted above the Nordic region today hosts two of the leading global 
suppliers of mobile systems, including switches, controller systems and radio and 
terminal systems, Ericsson and Nokia. But it is equally important to note the fact that 
both companies were for a very long time extremely hesitant about entering this 
industrial area. This raises a related point, which is that although they were hesitant, 
others were not. In all the four major Nordic countries there were several enthusiastic 
industrial entrepreneurs and companies that entered the mobile telephony industry in 
the early NMT phase during the 1980s with substantial success. All of them, most 
notably the Danish companies STORNO and AP Radio and the Norwegian company 
Simonsen Elektro, all with substantial capabilities in radio communication, have 
since disappeared. Why did Nokia and Ericsson achieve spectacular growth rates 
during the 1990s, while STORNO, for example, one of the world leading providers 
                                                 
41  Its secretary and later chairman, Thorleif Haug of the Swedish Televerket, later became the 
first chairman of the CEPT special group GSM. 
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of radio communication equipment in the 1960s, was acquired by Motorola, and then 
closed down in the early 1990s? 
Part of the answer lies in the fact that there were close contacts and even integration 
between national champion companies on the one hand and the Nordic NMT 
consortium jointly or the national telecom organisations separately on the other. 
These networks were to a large extent founded on longstanding relations, with a 
basis in the substantial technological developments in radio communication and 
switching and traffic technologies over several decades. In reality this constituted an 
informal protectionist industrial policy, aimed at securing a national industrial base 
and providing domestic companies with a dominant position in the emerging 
industry. In some cases this policy was formulated quite explicitly, if not in words 
then in deeds (see for example C. Palmberg 1998, Collett 1994). This policy may be 
seen as a rather natural outgrowth of the national role some of these telecom 
operators had, with rapidly increasing technological sophistication and orientation 
since the 1940s, leading to the establishment of substantial technological R&D 
facilities, and with a strong sense of obligation by these monopolies towards nation-
building industrial strategies. 
The leading edge character of the NMT system and the role of the NMT system in 
shaping the GSM system, allowed system and terminal suppliers involved in the 
implementation of the NMT system to build up relevant capabilities and expertise, 
besides a substantial market position. In the four Nordic countries Denmark, Finland, 
Sweden and Denmark, several attempts to build an NMT industry were evident. 
7.5.3 NMT industrial policy and NMT industrial practice – Nordic divergence 
At the Nordic level, the NMT project was designed to be open to all industrial 
contributions and supplies. The invitations for industrial contributions were in 
general widely distributed and information on system design and requirement made 
publicly available. However, this Nordic policy also included leaving 
implementation and procurement of NMT systems to the national agencies in each 
country. This allowed for focused industrial policies, whether implicit or explicit, 
formal or informal, to come into play. These policies, in these countries as well as in 
other European countries, had a strong focus on the development of national 
industrial capabilities, in many countries with a strong element of public ownership 
or public steering and co-ordination of industrial development. In Sweden the link 
between Televerket and Ericsson was in place long before NMT project started, and 
Fridlund (1997) describes the Televerket-Ericsson link  as a ‘development pair’.42 
The importance of this link was further enhanced by Sweden being, informally, the 
strategic leader of the Nordic consortium: the Nordic project was launched from 
Sweden, the project organisation was led from Sweden and the Swedish Televerket’s 
test lab ‘Radiolaboratorium’ was chosen as the location of the system testing and 
prototyping towards the end of the 1970s. In Finland there was a similar strong link 
                                                 
42  Development pairs are long term and institutionalised user-producer relations around the 
development of new technologies between Swedish engineering companies and procuring 
public agencies. Such pairs were frequent in Swedish public procurement. They were 
rationalised by the same kind of arguments as were used for national infant industry support, 
development of national champions and import substitution policies.  The pairs were 
generally tightly linked around consecutive joint development projects. 
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between the Finnish telecom agency and Nokia and Mobira (later Nokia Mobile 
Phones) (Palmberg 1998, Palmberg 1997, Palmberg and Lemola 1997). 
So key companies were pulled in into development process at the national level from 
an early stage. The current domination of two of these, Ericsson and Nokia happened 
despite the fact that they were not necessarily the most technologically capable 
companies available at the time. Though there are considerable national variations in 
the patterns of the interaction with industry, the histories of Nokia and Ericsson have 
some striking similarities; 
• the management of both companies seems in the late 1970s to have been 
reluctant to focus on mobile telephony, 
• a decisive role for both companies’ subsequent development was played by 
partly owned subsidiaries in radio communication, 
• during the 1980s both companies became mobile system suppliers, rather 
than specialised suppliers of subsystems – and both were early movers into 
this, 
• the importance of the national telecom agency and its long term relation to 
the company is evident. An essential element in the development of the 
companies was played by these agencies’ technological capabilities. 
As we shall argue below, it was critical in the new technology for suppliers to be 
system producers rather than component suppliers, and this is part of the reason for 
the success of Nokia and Ericsson. It is difficult to determine whether the implicit 
industrial policy of domestic procurement, of developing national industrial 
capability, was the primary goal or not. However, what we can say is that the 
development of the modern Nordic telecom industry happened on the basis of long 
term relationships between the telecom agencies and industry, against the 
background of an established and deliberate commitment in wider industrial policies 
to supporting national industries and companies, combined with a strong belief in the 
efficacy of technological development led by public ownership and procurement. In 
the Finnish case the support of the national industry orientation was explicit. In the 
Swedish case one central actor denies that Ericsson’s supply of switching capacity in 
the NMT system was an expression of supporting national champions. However, the 
AXE-system that Ericsson had to be convinced to use as base of its NMT system, 
had been developed jointly with Televerket through a high-profile technological 
collaboration, even at governmental level, that stretched back 20 years. 43 
Norway seems to be an exception among the three countries in mobile development. 
The reason for this is that although Norway had leading technology suppliers in 
mobile telephony, public sector attention in Norway was concentrated elsewhere – 
on a company called Norsk Data. In fact, Norsk Data (ND) was the central element 
                                                 
43  There are variations of this story in the literature. However, with the research done by the 
Linköping group, see McKelvey et al 1998, it seems clear that Ericsson wanted to base its 
tender to Televerket on the SPC electro-mechanical switching system AKE, and that 
Televerket threatened that the  contract would go to NEC unless Ericsson built AXE into the 
bid. 
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of Norwegian ICT policy from the late 1970s. Essentially, it was an attempt to create 
a major global player in mini-computing, using public procurement within Norway 
as the basic market. Norwegian Televerket never managed to convince ND that 
telecommunications should be a central concern, and this is an option simply never 
mentioned in the literature on the growth and fall of ND (such as Steine 1992). Up to 
its demise in the late 1980s, ND was highly focussed on hardware – not seeing itself 
even as a software company, but simply as a hardware producer of proprietary 
computer technology. At the same time, there seem to have been few attempts to 
convince the Norwegian parallel to Ericsson, EB (Elektrisk Bureau), of the benefits 
of entry into mobile communications. It may be that there was a tacit agreement on a 
trans-national division of labour, which would explain why the one indigenous 
Norwegian radio firm, Simonsen Elektro never got support for its rather advanced 
mobile technology. Then, at the transition to GSM, when it was definitely clear that 
the industry demanded system suppliers, Ericsson’s deal with ASEA locked out EB 
which was the only actor in Norway to enter in alliance with Simonsen. This was 
significant because the multi-functionality of the GSM system gave rise to a much 
more top-heavy system. Without system integration, the transition to GSM was 
almost impossible, and it was failure to become part of the system that caused 
Simonsen to disappear, along with with STORNO and others. 
But in fact, a similar point can be made about Danish development. STORNO A/S 
and AP Radio were among the major players in development of NMT terminals and 
base stations from the start. Both were part of the substantial Danish radio 
communication capability that had developed since the 1940s with a focus on marine 
radio communication. The Danish radio communication company and telecom 
consultant STORNO A/S was contracted by the Swedish Tele Board in 1968 to 
assess automatic mobile systems around the world. STORNO was later awarded a 
major contract jointly from the five telecom operators as part of the development of 
the technical structure of the subsequent NMT system in 1972-73 (Gerdes (1991). 
Eventually STORNO became one of the suppliers of mobile terminals and base 
stations for the NMT system in the 1980s.  
By the 1960s STORNO was the third largest producer of mobile radio-
communication equipment worldwide, after Motorola and General Electric. In 1976 
STORNO was in fact acquired by General Electric. However GE maintained the 
related technological R&D in Denmark. STORNO was sold out to Motorola in 1986 
and finally closed in the early 1990s, when major parts of STORNOs development 
capacity was taken over by Nokia. The Motorola GSM plant in Flensburg (Germany, 
close to the Danish border in a dual Danish/German language region), with a total 
employment of c. 3000, was originally a major STORNO plant established in 1967. 
With the reorganisation towards GSM-based production STORNO disappeared 
completely; the company name was changed to Motorola in 1992. 
AP Radio had a similar background and development, coming into mobile telephony 
from the radio industry.  AP Radio was eventually bought by Philips. 
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Model ap 4007 (NMT 450), AP-radio telephone  
The key advantage of LM Ericsson was a longstanding close connection to the 
national telecom agency, through which it became one of the first global turnkey 
suppliers of cellular mobile systems. Almost from its establishment in 1876 Ericsson 
was a major supplier of telephone equipment. Its relation to the national PTO 
Tele(graf)verket has fluctuated over its history, but since its reconstruction after Ivar 
Kreuger’s death in 1932 and the subsequent expansion and specialisation on 
telephone switching systems in the postwar period, integrated collaboration and joint 
development were the rule.  
The joint Electronics Committee established between Ericsson and Televerket in 
1956 had the task of supervising and coordinating development of electronic 
switching systems, and later on SPC (Stored Program Control) based systems (as the 
AKE 12 & 13). Frustrations on achieving efficient coordination of the two 
organisations, led the two chief executives to decide, at the instigation of by Marcus 
Wallenberg44 as the chairman of Ericsson, on the establishment of a jointly held 
company, ELLEMTEL Utvecklings AB, in 1970. Wallenberg was of course also 
Chairman of Investor AB, the largest strategic holding company in Sweden, and the 
main instrument of the so-called ‘Wallenberg-sphere’, a complex inter-locking set of 
industrial holdings that together constituted probably the most important  industrial 
grouping within Sweden. That the establishment of ELLEMTEL was a strategic and 
policy move of very great importance, is shown not just by the fact that the two chief 
executives and Wallenberg were involved, but also by the fact that acceptance had to 
be sought at Government level.45 Through this venture Ericsson and Televerket 
                                                 
44  Jan Werkelin suggests that the proposal to establish ELLEMTEL originated with Marcus 
Wallenberg; “At a lunch at the chairman of the Ericsson board, Marcus Wallenberg’s, office, 
chief executive Bjørn Lundvall and the Televerket Director General Björn Bjurel, got the 
opportunity of putting forward their viewpoints regarding the establishment of a joint 
development company. Evidently Wallenberg saw advantages outweighing disadvantages 
and on the same day Bjurel got the acceptance from the Government.”, [Sista AXE-stationen 
på plats i Älvros i Härjedalen (Last AXE station in place in Älvros in Härjedalen); 
http://www.telemuseum.se/, dated 19981118] 
Marcus Wallenberg was on the Ericsson board as deputy chairman from 1933, as chairman 
from 1953 until his final resignation in 1980. He was key in saving and restoring Ericsson 
after the Ivar Kreuger downfall, and later in buying back for Sweden in 1960 the Ericsson 
shares that had been controlled by ITT since 1932. The Wallenberg investment company 
Investor AB still, with Industrivärden AB, has control in Ericsson with about 67% of voting 
rights. 
For the insider’s view of the AXE story, see Meurling, John and Richard Jeans, A Switch in 
Time, CommunicationsWeek International on behalf of Ericsson Telecom AB 1995 
45  The agreement between Ericsson and Televerket was signed on 24 April 1970 
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joined forces in developing electronic automated stations, electronic switches, 
terminals for these systems, digital transmission systems etc. In this process the 
telecoms agency televerket was the driving force behind Ericsson’s technological 
development. 
ELLEMTEL’s major task became the development of a Program Controlled local 
station, which became known as the AXE system. The establishment of ELLEMTEL 
proved to be a decisive move. Ericsson was hesitant to enter the development of what 
became the AXE system. With ELLEMTEL Televerket had the means of pushing the 
development of a fully program controlled local exchange system into a first 
prototype system by 1976 and to a fully operative first version by 1980. By 1998 the 
AXE-isation of the Swedish fixed telephone system was complete, with 250 AXE 
stations installed, each with 10 to 60 000 subscribers, at an installation cost of 
approx. 20 bn SEK46. The collaboration through ELLEMTEL implied that Ericsson 
had the right to market AXE systems abroad, while the Swedish telecom system was 
supplied through Televerket’s joint rights in the system. AXE became a world 
leading telephone system, in use in more than 125 countries. It formed the crucial 
backbone in the development of Ericsson into a mobile telecom technology 
company, in spite of Ericsson’s hesitation about entering into its development. 
Ericsson’s dominant line of activities was in switching and exchange for fixed line 
telephone systems. During the 1970s this represented the dominant share of sales, 
and by 1973 the share of sales of switches and exchanges were about 60%, up from 
about 35% ten years earlier. Since the mid 1970s Ericsson has moved rapidly; in 
1973 Ericsson had net sales of about 5 GSEK, by 2000 net sales were more than 50 
times higher, about 274 GSEK, about a tenfold increase in real terms. Most of this 
growth has been during the 1990s when Ericsson became specialised as a mobile 
system and equipment supplier. Even in 1990 supplies to public telecom operators of 
stations and switches accounted for about 45% of net sales. By 1996 the share of 
these sales were down to 19%. In this year, following an organisational restructuring, 
mobiles systems and equipment accounted for 60% of Ericsson’s worldwide net 
sales. In 2000 Ericsson’s sales of these products were about 210 GSEK, or about 
88% of total sales. 
As mentioned, Ericsson seems to have hesitated to enter the development of the AXE 
system. A similar hesitation was to emerge during the 1980s, about entering mobile 
communication. Ericsson’s strategic focus until the late 1980s was on Information 
Systems, with Ericsson Information Systems being the key division in the 
corporation alongside the business area Public telecommunication (McKelvey, 
Texier and Alm 1998). EIS was sold off to Nokia in 1988. It was only during the 
1990s that Ericsson made the move to become a supplier of mobile technology and 
systems. 
Furthermore, when Televerket contacted Ericsson to tender for exchange systems for 
NMT in 1977, Ericsson did not base it on the AXE-system, but on the large scale 
electro-mechanical distribution switching system AKE-13. Televerket gave Ericsson 
an ultimatum, either deliver an AXE-system, or loose the contract to NEC (Mölleryd 
1996, McKelvey et al 1998). 
                                                 
46 Jan Werkelin op. cit. 
 
 53
It was Ericsson’s acquisition of SRA, a company that after selling off its consumer 
market activities in 1964, with its brand name Radiola, became a specialised 
producer of radio communication equipment. SRA’s customer base was dominated 
by public procurement; radio equipment in defence contracts and mobile radio in 
collaboration with Televerket. The strategic move by SRA management in the 1960s 
to focus business away from defence towards civilian activities provided the birth of 
“Ericsson’s nascent mobile telephony business” (McKelvey et al, op cit). Owned 
since 1927 by Ericsson and the Marconi corporation, it was taken over by Ericsson in 
1983 and integrated into Ericssons radio communication division, giving Ericsson 
access to SRA’s expertise on the radio side. SRA also provided the internal agents 
inside Ericsson to convince to company to base its delivery on the AXE-system, 
though its use in mobile networks were seen as limited. SRA thus became the second 
major gateway for Ericsson into mobile telephony. 
7.5.4 Telephony and systems supply 
A full analysis of this evolution of the Nordic telecom industry, of the emergence of 
Ericsson and Nokia as global suppliers, the demise of STORNO, Simonsen and 
others, is beyond the scope of this essay. We note however, that what the Danish and 
Norwegian suppliers of NMT equipment shared was a main focus on terminal 
equipment and the radio subsystem. Essentially this implied a focus of the front end, 
the radio part, of the mobile system, separating it from the ‘back end’ switching and 
network parts and also from the interface with the fixed network. 
What characterised Ericsson’s and Nokia’s entrance into the mobile industry was the 
ability to transform into becoming system suppliers, into having technological 
capabilities on all related areas of mobile technology, from the PSTN interface to the 
mobile terminal. The GSMs character as a multi-service system, with voice, data and 
paging (i.e. SMS) services, in contrast to NMTs single service functionality, has in 
addition to the shifting of complexity from terminal to base station system, adding 
further complexity to the network system and providing potential economies in 
managing the whole chain. 
By the mid-1990s, the GSM system was well established on the European scene, and 
the importance of integrated supply was evident. The table below shows market 
shares on GSM supplies with respect to switching, base stations and terminals in 
1996. The former two are accumulated market shares until the end of 1996, while 
terminal shares are for sales in 1996. 
Market shares GSM suppliers 1996. Source: Bekkers and Smits 1997 
 Switching market Base station market Terminal market 
Ericsson 48% 7% 25% 
Nokia 14% 22% 24% 
Motorola 1% 13% 20% 
Siemens 21% 2% 9% 
Alcatel 10% 10% 6% 
Lucent 2% 4%  
Matra 2% 3%  
Nortel 1%  3% 
 
 54
By 1996 five companies dominated the GSM system industry, two of which were 
Nordic companies. In 1996 the C3 concentration ratios were; 83% in the exchange 
part, 45% in the base station segment and 69% in the terminal market. Nokia’s later 
success in global terminal sales is well known, attaining about 35% of terminal sales 
in 2000. The noteworthy point, however, is that all the leading companies were 
market leaders in at least two of the segments of mobile systems supply. Globally 
these markets are highly oligopolistic and technologically specialized. 
We note further that of the major suppliers world wide of telecom equipment to 
mobile telephony and associated communication, almost all companies share two 
features. Generally they are large, globalised and well established at the time when 
the technology took off (many of these companies already had a century long 
history). Furthermore, almost all of them grew out of the internationalised and highly 
oligopolisitic industry of supply of large scale telecom equipment to PTOs and 
related organisations. The Swedish case of the Ericsson-Televerket development pair 
is just one among many examples of what formed the basis of the mobile 
communication industry. As an illustration – only one single company of the ten 
majors in this industry came into the industry with most of its industrial history tied 
to the radio side – Motorola. 
8. Governance and innovation in Nordic telecoms 
Thus far we have simply outlined key elements of the story of the development of 
cell-based mobile telephone communication in the Nordic area, highlighting the 
corporate efforts and initiatives of the national telecom operators and the Nordic 
collaboration between them. This is done with a specific aim in mind, to see these 
organisations’ efforts of developing mobile communication systems as an illustration 
of the wider technological and industrial strategies, and specifically braoder issues of 
governance. These issues are tied up with the de facto national monopoly on 
infrastructure development and service provision held by the telecoms operators. In 
this section we turn to some reflections on the links between governance and this 
long innovation trajectory. 
What explains this popularity of mobile telephony in the Nordic countries? We argue 
that there must be several dimensions to any attempt to answer this question. On one 
level there is the development and supply of an innovative and appropriate 
technology. The technological dynamism of the Nordic PTO companies, which was 
integrated with a general set of appropriate capabilities (in radio technologies for 
example) within the Nordic area. The governance systems of these companies, and 
particularly their industrial links, made it possible to envisage uses for mobile 
telephony, and to make radical long-term technological choices. On the other hand, 
these companies were and are located in societies that were receptive to new 
technologies, and were quick to see the possibilities that such technologies as 
portable radio and ultimately mobile telephony offered to those living in Nordic 
societies. 
From the technological perspective, our starting point is a rather simple, but often 
forgotten, observation. This was a long-term cumulative process, based on sustained 
commitments. Mobile telephony is not a technology that suddenly appeared as full-
fledged first generation systems, evolving directly into second generation systems, 
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developed more or less from scratch over a short time span during the last two 
decades of the 20th century. On the contrary, mobile communications are broadly 
speaking almost as old as the invention of the Bell telephone. Although the idea of 
mobile telephone communication systems emerged with telephone systems 
themselves, however, the development of the requisite technologies and systems took 
almost a century to develop. In fact, with long distance transmission of voice, the 
conceptual idea of  ‘on the move’ communication was rather simple, and areas where 
such a system would be valuable were readily identified. However, the technical 
barriers to achieve this turned out to be huge, and new barriers were discovered as 
the basic idea was refined to reflect potential opportunities that could be envisaged if 
the technology and related science progressed. 
The reason for this slow process is that the core of a mobile phone system is a radio 
communication system. A systematic exploration of and experimentation with, and 
even more wide spread exploitation of radio communication had to await the 
development of capabilities, science-based insights and technologies, beyond radio 
communication proper, that would not be systematically available before the 1940s 
and the 1950s. The development of systems and designs for handling of 
telecommunication and the mastering of VHF transmission were crucial elements, as 
were developments in enabling technologies such as electronics. 
The hypothesis underlying this paper is that the Nordic telecom administrations – in 
their capacity as de facto monopoly providers of a wide range of telecom services – 
were crucial in driving and organising the development of mobile phone systems, 
first and primarily in the Nordic area, later through their participation in the 
development of the pan-European GSM standard and system. The possibility of 
playing this role was partly a consequence of the development of a substantial 
technological capability during the post-war period. The awareness of new 
technologies, in electronics, in radio communications etc., and the increasing 
capability to develop and utilise these, founded a culture in which technological 
opportunity implied a developmental responsibility. The obligation to be of national 
and social use, prevalent throughout the Nordic public sector, facilitated this and 
there was no dearth of potential social and economic areas with needs for a wide 
range of new telecom services. 
The emphasis on economic and social need means that the role of these PTOs in the 
development of the technologically advanced NMT system during the 1970s was 
integrated with a deliberate strategy of building national industrial capabilities in 
these countries. This in turn reflected the dominant industrial policy fundamentals of 
corporatist industrial development in the Nordic area in the post war period. So 
during the post-war era the Nordic telecom administrations developed into 
technologically oriented organisations with a leading role at the national level in 
several telecom areas. The outcome of this process is well-known. When the NMT 
system led on to the GSM system a basis had been laid for the emergence of a 
dominant Nordic industry in the area of mobile communication. We suggest that the 
various roles played by the national PTOs in this process were indispensable. The 
question is what these roles really were. 
Broadly speaking, two core roles have been suggested. Firstly, the Nordic PTOs 
played a central role as standards setters. The process of developing the NMT system 
may then be described essentially as one of developing the necessary technological 
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requirements for the mobile communication system and the required standardisation 
of the various communication interfaces such a system involves. Such a model of 
standardisation in the area of telecoms, the open system approach (OSI), with a 
layered and modular structure, was central in the ISDN system, and this had a clear 
impact on development of the GSM specifications. ISDN has even been 
characterised as the Godfather of GSM (Mouly and Pautet 1992). This role of the 
Nordic PTOs can also be claimed for the NMT system, even though that system 
lacked the clear modularity of the later GSM specifications. The basic limitation of 
some current approaches in explaining the links between the incipient mobile 
communication industry in the Nordic area and the national PTOs is that they 
describe these linkages in more or less a-historical terms, and with an arms-length 
notion in analysing these linkages. However these links were highly organised, and 
where linkages related to the standardisation process they were able to attain such 
importance because they developed on the basis of a pre-existing matrix of relations. 
A second role of the Nordic PTOs takes as a starting point their role as public 
agencies whose primary task was the supply  of telecom services. The PTOs role in 
procurement of telecom and network equipment from industry then becomes pivotal 
for the development of telecom technology. Here, the PTOs state-of-the-art 
technological competences were central, as were their capabilities in transforming 
potential user needs into technological specifications for the underlying telecom 
equipment. Thus, PTOs in their capacity as public procurers  of telecom equipment, 
played a ‘lead user’ role in the sense of von Hippel (von Hippel 1988). This approach 
is closer to describing the actual process than the standardisation approach. However, 
such an analysis needs to be supplemented with consideration of the market 
structure; broadly speaking the Nordic market for mobile communication technology 
in the 1970s and 1980s was monopsonistic (see Palmberg 1998 for discussion). 
It should be borne in mind that the development of NMT could well have been a 
dead-end. When the NMT system was introduced in 1980-81, it was widely 
acknowledged as the best available in terms of up-to-date technological 
characteristics. The potential for growth in the use of mobile technology was 
recognised, though on a much more modest scale and limited market scope than what 
was realised over the next two decades. The Nordic system and its implementation 
thus had the attention of producers of equipment and terminals world-wide. 
However, NMT was an analogue system, and the development of the second 
generation digital systems was already under way when NMT began to diffuse into 
the Nordic societies.  
The transition from analogue to digital was potentially capability-destroying, in the 
Anderson and Tushman sense. The strategic industrial implications of the 
technological choices made in the GSM work was well acknowledged by the early 
1980s. Attempts to capture the GSM standard for more or less protectionist reasons 
were made, attempts that might have brought the Nordic countries several steps back. 
That this possibility was avoided was in large part due to a clear strategic awareness 
in the Nordic telecom operators of NMT and the technological choices involved, as a 
just one step on the road towards digital systems. From the start, the Nordic PTOs 
were actively involved in the development of the GSM standard. In fact, the initial 
work that led to the establishment of the GSM project in 1982 was seen by the 
Nordic PTOs as the natural next step – as a ‘second generation’ NMT. The first 
chairman of the GSM group, Thorleif Haug of the Swedish PTO, later Telia, had 
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previously been chairman of the Nordic NMT group and had been involved in the 
NMT project since its inception in 1970. The transition from the analogue NMT 
system of the 1980s to the digital GSM system of the 1990s, if anything, even further 
accelerated mobile leap-frogging by the Nordic countries. 
On the technological side, our hypothesis is therefore that the strategies and 
technology procurements of the telecom administrations, and the formal and informal 
networks between the administrations and national industries are the keys to 
explaining why this technology and industry emerged so strongly in the Nordic 
countries. But it is also important to consider potential users. In the sparsely 
populated Nordic region, with an aggregate population of just 24 million, shared 
among five politically and economically integrated countries and three autonomous 
regions, communications are always a major problem. These are societies with both 
the resources and willingness to adopt innovations in this field. These were societies 
in the forefront of diffusion of the telegraph, and of portable radios in the 1950s. 
Mobile telephony was perfect for a geographically dispersed, mobile population. 
However, not too much should be made of such a factor-induced explanation of the 
early penetration of mobile telephony in the Nordic countries. The markets that were 
targeted during the first period were primarily urban business markets,  focused on 
car phones, an immediate extension of the markets that had been served by former 
mobile systems. The diffusion was evidently aided by these phones becoming 
something of a signal maker for the ‘yuppie’ movement during the mid-1980s. The 
popularity of the NMT 450 system, and the rapid congestion of capacity in the major 
urban sites, came as something of a surprise to the Nordic PTOs. The original NMT 
system, initiated in 1981, soon had to be revised and extended, leading to the 
introduction of the 900 MHz NMT system in 1986, in the wake of more or less 
unforeseen demand for the system. 
The de-, or rather re-, -regulation of telecom service and infrastructure provision 
during the 1980s and 1990s has fundamentally changed the role of these 
organisations in their national context. Can we envisage a similar story unfolding at a 
later stage in some other emerging technologically led telecom area? Can these 
organisations, together with national authorities replay this kind of national industrial 
strategy? Probably not. The fundamental changes in governance structures, 
devolution of their various standardising and regulative functions and a reduced role 
as a national technological resource and leading environment are all ultimately linked 
to the abolition of their de facto monopoly positions.  
So how can we relate the development of technological and industrial strategies in 
the national telecom operators during the last decades to changes in these strategies 
and to concomitant changes in the governance structures of these organisations? 
These strategies seems to have changed away from strategic perspectives ultimately 
based on ‘national’ considerations, to large extent shaped by technological 
opportunities, albeit within the framework of the politically acceptable, and beyond 
private commercial interests of the company. This strategic orientation went hand in 
hand with the development of new technological capabilities, with an obvious 
technology-driven backround and orientation. The establishment of the R&D 
organisation Televerkets Forskningsinstitutt in 1967 is part of this trend, following in 
the wake of the increased focus since the late 1950s of the potential of new 
electronics to revolutionise telecom systems and infrastructures. The role of the two 
Televerk in Sweden and Norway at this time was that through their combination of 
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publicly organised tasks and functions they became system developers, procuring 
components and shaping a system which in another contexts resembles the concept 
of a military-industrial complex. 
In this context the joint responsibilities of organisations as these was complex. They 
were infrastructure owners, service providers, regulating and certifying organisations 
(eg for telecom equipment), as well as their universal service obligations. They were 
seen, and evidently saw themselves, as part of a social infrastructure or social 
overhead, and not as profit-seeking service providers. The willingness to embark on 
the process of developing mobile telephony was arguably a part of this orientation. 
The new system which ahs emerged places a much greater emphasis on new business 
development, international expansion, and mergers and acquisitions. In the new 
governance system, some of thee firms are already facing difficult financial 
constraints. It is unliklely that the radical development of mobile telephony could be 
repeated in the new context. 
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